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Abstract
This thesis studies distance approximation in two closely related models - the streaming
model and the two-party communication model.
In the streaming model, a massive data stream is presented in an arbitrary order to a
randomized algorithm that tries to approximate certain statistics of tile data with only a
few (usually one) passes over the data. For instance, the data may be a flow of packets
on the internet or a set of records in a large database. The size of the data necessitates
the use of extremely efficient randomized approximation algorithms. Problems of interest
include approximating the number of distinct elements, approximating the surprise index
of a stream, or more generally, approximating the norm of a dynamically-changing vector
in which coordinates are updated multiple times in an arbitrary order.
In the two-party communication model, there are two parties who wish to efficiently
compute a relation of their inputs. We consider the problem of approximating Lp distances
for any p > 0. It turns out that lower bounds on the communication complexity of these re-
lations yield lower bounds on the memory required of streaming algorithms for the problems
listed above. Moreover, upper bounds in the streaming model translate to constant-round
protocols in the communication model with communication proportional to the memory
required of the streaming algorithm. The communication model also llas its own applica-
tions, such as secure datamining, where in addition to low communication, the goal is not
to allow either party to learn more about the other's input other than what follows from
the output and his/her private input.
We develop new algorithms and lower bounds that resolve key open questions in both
of these models. The highlights of the results are as follows.
1. We give an Q(1/E2) lower bound for approximating the number of distinct elements of
a data stream in one pass to within a (1 ± c) factor with constant probability, as well
as the p-th frequency moment Fp for any p Ž 0. This is tight up to very small factors,
and greatly improves upon the earlier Q(1/E) lower bound for these problems. It also
gives the same quadratic improvement for the communication complexity of 1-round
protocols for approximating the Lp distance for any p 2 0.
2. We give a 1-pass O(ml- 2/p)-space streaming algorithm for (1 ± 6)-approximating the
Lp norm of an m-dimensional vector presented as a data stream for any p 2 2.
This algorithm improves the previous ((m1 - 1/(P-')) bound, and is optimal up to
polylogarithmic factors. As a special case our algorithm can be used to approximate
the frequency moments Fp of a data stream with the same optimal amount of space.
This resolves the main open question of the 1996 paper by Alon, Matias, and Szegedy.
3. In the two-party communication model, we give a protocol for privately approximating
the Euclidean distance (L 2) between two m-dimensional vectors, held by different
parties, with only polylog m communication and 0(1) rounds. This tremendously
improves upon the earlier protocol of Feigenbaum, Ishai, Malkin, Nissim, Strauss,
and Wright, which achieved O(vm) communication for privately approximating the
Hamming distance only.
This thesis also contains several previously unpublished results concerning the first item
above, including new lower bounds for the communication complexity of approximating the
Lp distances when the vectors are uniformly distributed and the protocol is only correct for
most inputs, as well as tight lower bounds for the multiround complexity for a restricted
class of protocols that we call linear.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Consider the following scenario: there are two players, Alice and Bob, holding inputs x and y
respectively, who wish to compute a function f(x, y). To do this, they need to communicate
with each other. They'd like to do this by transmitting as few bits as possible. This is the
classical two-party communication model introduced by Yao [69, 53].
Depending on the function f and the resources available, this task may require a lot of
communication or very little. Examples of such resources include space and time complexity,
as well as the ability to flip random coins. One class of functions of considerable interest
is the class of distance functions. In this case, x and y are finite strings of length m, with
characters drawn from an alphabet E, and f(x, y) measures how similar the strings are.
For example, if E = {0, 1}, then f(x, y) could be the Hamming distance between x and
y, that is, the number of positions which differ. If E is the set of real numbers R, a natural
distance function f is the Lp distance. Here, Lp(x, y) is defined to be (E-l 1xi - yi P)l/P.
If p = 2, this is the Euclidean distance. When p = 0, it is natural to define Lo(x, y) as the
Hamming distance between x and y.
Most of this thesis is concerned with some form of study of the communication com-
plexity of approximating Lp distances. In this case, it is not a function f(x, y) that
we are after, but rather a relation S C X x y x Z, where (x, y, z) E S if and only if
(1 - e)Lp(x, y) < z < (1 + e)Lp(x, y), where e > 0 is an approximation parameter.
A major reason for studying distance approximation in the communication model is the
strong connection with the data-stream model [2, 58].
The Data-Stream Model: Imagine an internet router with only limited storage and
processing power. Everyday, gigabytes of information travel through the router in the form
of packets. Despite its limited abilities, the router would like to make sense of this informa-
tion, but it will settle for a few basic statistics. For example, it might want to know what
fraction of network IP addresses have daily traffic, which IP addresses are the most popular,
or which, if any, IP addresses have received a sudden spike in traffic. In the data-stream
model a huge stream of elements is presented to an algorithm in an arbitrary, possibly
adversarial order, and the algorithm is only given a constant number of passes (usually
one) over the stream. In most cases the limited resources of the algorithm imply that only
probabilistic estimates are possible.
More formally, suppose A is an algorithm which, in an online fashion, receives items
labeled by integers i E [m]. For example, i could be the destination IP address of a packet
passing through a router running A. Note that A may receive as input the same item i
many times. Let fi be the number of occurrences of item i, and for p Ž 0, define the p-th
frequency moment Fp = -iE[m] ff. This statistic was defined by Alon, Matias, and Szegedy
[2], and is just the p-th power of the Lp norm of the vector represented by the stream. When
p = 0, we let 00 = 0. Thus, Fo is the number of distinct elements in the stream.
There are several practical motivations for designing space-efficient algorithms for ap-
proximating the frequency moments. In the networking example above, Fo can be used to
determine the fraction of network IP addresses that have daily traffic. There are also al-
gorithms (see, e.g., [21]) for finding the most popular IP addresses with error that depends
on the F2-value of the packet stream, so estimating this quantity is useful for bounding
the error of such algorithms. Fp for higher p gives an indication of the skewness of the
data stream. As p -- co, Fp approaches maxi[m,,] fi. For an application of Fp-estimation
algorithms to detecting Denial of Service attacks, see [1].
The frequency moments are also very valuable to the database community. With com-
mercial databases approaching the size of 100 terabytes, it is infeasible to make multiple
passes over the data. Query optimizers can use F0 to find the number of unique values in
a database without having to perform an expensive sort. F2 is a quantity known as the
surprise index or Gini's index of honoweneity. Efficient algorithms for F2 are useful for
determining the output size of self-joins (see, e.g., [38]). Finally, Fp for p > 2 can be used
to measure the size of a self-join on more than two tables of a database or to approximate
the maximum frequency of an entry.
The Connection Between Communication and Data-Stream Models: Suppose,
for example, that there is a streaming algorithm A that outputs Fo such that
Pr[(1 - e)Fo 5 0o 5 (1 + e)Fo] > 1 - 6,
where the probability is taken only over A's coin tosses. A natural bound of interest is how
much memory A needs. This is where communication complexity comes into play.
Suppose Alice has x E {0, 1}m, Bob has y E {0, 1}m , and they would like to estimate
the Hamming distance A(x, y). Alice creates a stream S, as follows. For each i such that
xi = 1, Alice appends i to S,. Similarly, Bob creates Sy. Alice then runs A on S,. When she
is finished, she transmits the memory :contents of A to Bob, who continues the computation
on Sy. At the end, A will have been run on S = S, o Sy, the concatenation of the two
streams.
For s E {0, 1}m, let wt(s) be the number of ones in the string s. Alice also transmits
wt(x) to Bob, using O(log m) bits. A simple calculation shows that
Fo(S) wt(x) + t(y) + A(, y)
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If A were to compute Fo(S), Bob could compute A(x, y). Thus, the memory required of A
must be at least the communication required for computing the Hamming distance, minus
the O(logm) bits needed for transmitting wt(x). Similarly, approximating Fo translates
into approximating A(x, y), and so lower bounds on the memory required can be obtained
even for randomized approximation algorithms. Similarly, lower bounds on the communi-
cation of approximating Lp distances translate into lower bounds on approximating Fp in
the streaming model. Thus, important statistics in the data-stream model translate into
distance computations in the communication setting.
Not only do lower bounds in the communication model yield lower bounds in the stream-
ing model, but oftentimes upper bounds in the communication model yield upper bounds
in the streaming model. Here the connection is informal, and on a case-by-case basis.
A large part of this thesis will be devoted to the streaming complexity of the frequency
moments of a data stream. We will give nearly optimal upper bounds for Fp when p > 2,
and improve the known lower bounds for all p > 0.
Secure Datamining: Another fairly recent application of communication complexity is
secure datamining (see, e.g., [55]). Imagine there are two hospitals, which for medical re-
search purposes, would like to mine their joint data. Due to patient confidentiality, the
hospitals would not like to share more of their data thau necessary. As private distance ap-
proximation is a subroutine in private classification aind private clustering algorithms, it is
important to understand its complexity in order to understand that of the larger algorithms.
In this thesis we will give very efficient protocols for privately approximating the Ham-
ming and Euclidean distance, so that no party learns more about each other's input other
than what is necessary. We will also discuss extensions of private distance approximation
to private near neighbor problems. To do this, we will introduce a new notion of privacy
suitable for search problems.
Previous Results: The previous results in the non-private communication setting are
summarized by the following table. The notation 0, 9, and ( will suppress factors that
are logarithmnic in m, and when talking about the streaming model, that are logarithmic in
mn, where n is the length of the stream. All quantities refer to the total commnunication
between the two parties, which are assumed to run in polynomial time.
Upper Bounds Lower Bounds
Hamming Distance O(1/E2) [31, 9] Q2(1/E) [5]
L2 O(1/C2) [49] Q(1/E) [5]
Lp, p > 2 O(ml-1/(P-1))poly(1/e) [25, 33] ý(ml- 2/P)poly(1/e) [7, 6, 65, 20]
Note that the bounds for the Hamming and Euclidean distance depend only polylogarith-
mically on m, whereas for Lp, p > 2, the dependence is polynomial. Thus, for the Hamming
and Euclidean distance, the main parameter of interest is the dependence on 1/E. Indeed,
a 0(1/E2) upper bound versus a 0(1/E) upper bound can make the difference in practice
between setting E = .01, say, and setting E = .0001.
For the Lp distance when p > 2, there is a polynomial gap in the upper and lower
bounds. For instance, if p = 3 the upper bound is O(rml / 2)poly(1/E) while the lower bound
is Q(ml/3 )poly(1/e). Since m is very large in practice (e.g., in the streaming applications
mentioned above), the main parameter of interest here is the dependence on m.
The bounds for the corresponding streaming problems are very similar. For F0 and F2 ,
the upper bounds are O(1/e 2 ) bits of space [31, 2, 9], while the lower bounds are Q(1/E) [5].
For F, p > 2, the upper bound is 6(m'•1/(P-1))poly(1/e) [25, 33]1 while the lower bound is
Q(m'-2/p)poly(1/e) [7, 6, 65, 20]. The upper bounds are all realized by algorithms that get
only one pass over the input, while the lower bounds allow any constant number of passes.
In the private setting, the previous state of affairs is much worse. It is summarized by
the following table.
Upper Bounds Lower Bounds
Hamming Distance O(Vmil/e) [29] Q(1/e) [5]
L2 6(m) [36, 70] Q(1/E) [5]
Lp, p > 2 0(m) [36, 70] Q(ml- 2/p)poly(1/E) [7, 6, 65, 20]
Even for the Hamming and Euclidean distance, the upper bound with privacy depends
polynomially on m. For the Lp distance for p > 2, the dependence is even linear. In all
cases, the lower bounds just follow from the communication lower bounds in the setting
without privacy.
Our results: Both in the non-private and private settings, we provide resolutions to many
of the existing bounds. In the setting without privacy, our results are summarized as follows.
Upper Bounds Lower Bounds
Hamming Distance 6(1/62) I (1/62) for 1-round protocols [46, 68]
L2 6(1/E2 ) Q(1/e 2) for 1-round protocols [68]
Lp, p > 2 )(ml- 2/p)poly(1/e) [47] Q(ml- 2/p)poly(1/E)
Our contribution for the L, distance for p > 2 is a new upper bound of 0(m 1 -2/P)poly(1/e).
Perhaps surprisingly, our new protocol achieving this bound only uses one round of com-
munication. Moreover, it can be implemented in the streaming model by an algorithm
that makes only one pass over the data stream and uses only 0(ml- 2/p)poly(1/e) bits of
space. This gives a streaming algorithm with the same complexity for approximating the
frequency moments, and resolves the main question left open in the paper of Alon, Matias,
and Szegedy [2].
'Independently of our work, Ganguly [33] achieved )(ml-2/(p+l))poly(1/E) space.
While our main contribution for the Lp distance for p > 2 is a new upper bound, our
main contribution for the Hamming and Euclidean distances is a new lower bound. For
the Hamming and Euclidean distances, we show a matching ft(1/E 2) lower bound, but our
bound holds only for 1-round protocols. For streaming algorithms, this gives an [(1/e 2)
lower bound for algorithms approximating the number of distinct elements, as well as for
algorithms approximating Fp for any p, using only one pass over the input. This is not
much of a restriction, since the most common setting in the data stream model is when the
algorithm only has one pass. We also show that for a certain natural class of protocols,
which we call linear, the [1(1/e 2) bound holds for multi-round protocols.
Note that for constant p, approximating Lp(x, y) has the same complexity as approx-
imating LP(x,y). Moreover, when z,y E {0,1}m, 4,(x,y) = A(x,y). Thus, for any
x, y E {0, 1,..., z} m , for any integer z, we obtain the [(1/c2) bound for approximating
Lp(x, y) based on our lower bound for approximating A(x, y). We also extend our result to
show an [1(1/e 2) lower bound even when x and y are uniformly distributed and the protocol
need only be correct for most pairs of inputs.
In the case with privacy, we provide an exponential improvement to the communica-
tion complexity of privately approximating both the Hamming and the Euclidean distance.
Moreover, our protocol can be implemented with a constant number of rounds. This shows,
rather unexpectedly, that privately approximating the Hamming or the Euclidean distance
is not that much harder than approximating it without privacy. For the Lp distance, p > 2,
we leave it as an open question to resolve the polynomial gap in known bounds. This is
summarized by the following table. We also give new protocols for exact near neighbor and
develop new models and non-trivial upper bounds for approximate near neighbor queries.
Upper Bounds Lower Bounds
Hamming Distance 6(1/,E2) [48] [(1/e)
L2  6(1/E2) [48] [(1/e)
Lp, p > 2 6(m) [(ml- 2/p)poly(1/e)
Our Techniques: This thesis unifies techniques in three different worlds - algorithm design
(Section 3), communication complexity (Section 4), and cryptography (sections 5 and 6).
The common theme is the study of distance approximation.
Our upper bounds for approximating Lp, due to Indyk and the author [47], significantly
depart from earlier algorithms, which were obtained by constructing a single estimator,
which was shown to equal Lp in expectation and have small variance. We instead group
coordinates into buckets based on their values, and try to estimate the size of each bucket.
This involves looking at certain randomly chosen substreams of the original stream and
invoking a heavy-hitter algorithm on the substream. We can then sum up the contributions
of each bucket to obtain an approximation to Lp.
Our lower bounds for streaming algorithms for Lp are derived using the classical frame-
work of communication complexity. Moiost previous lower bounds in the streaming literature
came from studying the disjointness (see, e.g., [50, 64])and indexing functions (see, e.g.,
[51]). We, however, introduce a new problem - the gap Hamming distance problem, and
give a surprising way to lower bound its communication complexity. This problem was first
suggested by Indyk and the author [46] and studied explicitly by the author [68]. This
problem captures approximating distinct elements of a data stream, as well as Lp norms for
p > 0, as shown by the author in [68).
Our upper bound for privately approximating L2 in the communication model, due to
Indyk and the author [48], involves a new way of making a certain dimensionality reduction
technique private. We use a secure subprotocol to carefully truncate sensitive information
from the view of the parties. Our security definitions for private approximate near neighbor
problems were first formulated in [48], And were adopted by others (see, e.g., Section 4 of
[10]).
Followup Work: After our work, the polylogarithnmic factors in our upper bounds for
approximating Lp distances and the frequency moments [47] were improved by Bhuvana-
giri, Ganguly, Kesh, and Saha [15]. We will present our original proof of the upper bound.
Our main idea in [47] of classifying frequencies into buckets and estimating bucket sizes
using CountSketch [21] is also used by [15]. Techniques similar to ours [47] as well as those
in [15] also appeared in work by Bhuvanagiri and Ganguly [14] on upper bounding the
complexity of entropy estimation in the streaming model.
The proofs of our lower bounds for approximating Lp distances and the frequency mo-
ments [46, 68] were simplified by Bar-Yossef et al [8], and we will present a similarly sim-
plified proof. We will also present a new proof using distributional complexity due to the
author which has a number of additional features. The lower bound techniques of Indyk
and the author [47] were also used by Andoni, Indyk, and PAtra§cu [4] to show optimality
of the dimensionality reduction method. Moreover, the gap Hamming Distance problem
and the techniques developed by Indyk and the author (46] and the author [68] appeared
in work by Chakrabarti, Cormode, and McGregor [191 for lower bounding the complexity
of entropy estimation in the streaming model. Various attempts at bypassing our Q(1/e 2)
bounds were considered. For example, Cormode and Muthukrishnan [26] look at streams
generated according to Zipfian distributions and can then approximate Fo and F2 in o(1/E 2)
space.
Our private approximation algorithm for the Euclidean distance and related techniques
[48] were used by Strauss and Zheng [66] for privately approximating the heavy hitters. Our
upper bounds for private near neighbor problems [48] were considered by Chmielewski and
Hoepman [22], who tried to make them more practical. Finally, our new models for private
approximations of search problems [48] were used by Beimel, Hallak, and Nissim [10] in the
context of clustering algorithms.
Roadmap: In the next section, we formalize the streaming model.
In Section 3 we obtain a new streaming algorithm for approximating Lp, p > 0, to within
an arbitrarily small e > 0. Our algorithm achieves optimal space, up to polylogarithmic
factors, and consequently gives essentially optimal communication for approximating the
Lp distance in the communication model.
In Section 4, we prove lower bounds for the one-way communication complexity of
approximating Lp distances for any p > 0. This yields an Q2(1/0 2) lower bound for the
space complexity of approximating the frequency moments Fp in the streaming model for
any p > 0. We extend this result in several ways.
In Section 5, we develop a new private protocol for approximating the Euclidean dis-
tance between two parties to within an arbitrarily small E > 0 using only polylogarithmic
communication.
In Section 6, we continue the study of private approximations. We first look at the
complexity of several exact near neighbor problems. Then, in an attempt to further improve
the complexity, we define a new notion of approximate privacy suitable for near neighbor
problems, and we give non-trivial private protocols for these problems.
Chapter 2
Streaming Algorithms
In the data stream model we think of there being an underlying array A[1], A[2],..., A[im].
We then see a stream of n elements of the form (j, Uj), where j E [m] and Uj is a number.
We may see the same pair (j, Uj) more than once, or see (j, Uj) for U' = Uj. There are four
common models of data streams: the time series model, the cash register model, the strict
turnstile model, and the turnstile model (see, e.g., [58] for an exposition).
In the time series model, for each j E [m], there is only pair in the stream with first
coordinate j. Moreover, the pairs are sorted by first coordinate, so the stream appears as
(1, U1), (2, U2),..., (m, Urn). This model is often unrealistic due to the sortedness of the
stream, and we do not consider it in this thesis.
A more general model is the cash register model. In this model, the only restriction is
that for each pair (j, Uj) in the stream, Uj > 0. This is perhaps the most popular data
stream model ([58]), and is suitable for monitoring IP addresses that access a web server.
An even more general model is the strict turnstile model. Here, the Uj may be arbitrary
numbers subject to the following constraint. Consider the (ordered) substream of pairs
(j, Ujj), (j, vj 2),U..., (Juj,.fj),
where fj is the number of occurrences of j in the data stream. The constraint is that for
any i, 1 < i < fj, we have E• L Uj,k , O0. This models many applications, such as in a
database where you can only delete items that have already been entered.
Finally, the most general model is the turnstile model. This is like the strict turnstile
model, but without any restrctions on the Ujs. This models signals that may be both
positive and negative at any point in time.
In our lower bounds, we will consider the cash register model, which is the second
weakest model (only the time series model is weaker, and actually quite trivial to compute
statistics in). In our upper bounds, we will consider the turnstile model, which is the most
general model.
We will be interested in computing norms on data, streams. Formally, we are given a
stream of elements S = (1, al), (2, a2 ), .., (n, an), which appear in arbitrary order, and we
have an algorithm A which computes a fulction f : [m]'r --+ Zo on the stream.
Definition 1 An algorithm A is an (e, 6)-approximation algorithm if for all streams S of
n elements of the universe [m],
Pr[(1 - e)f(S) • A(S) 5 (1 + )f(S)] > 1 - 6,
where the probability is over the coin tosses of A.
Various efficiency measures of A are possible, including its space, update time, and query
time.
Definition 2 The space complexity of an (e, 6) -approximation algorithm A for a function
f, denoted S(A) is the maximum amount of space the algorithm uses, over all possible input
streams S and all random coin tosses of the algorithm. Its update time, denoted UT(A) is
the maximum, over all input streams 8, all integers i E [n], and all random coin tosses,
of the time taken to process ai given ai,..., ai-1. The query time, denoted QT(A), is the
maximum, over all input streams S and all random coin tosses, of the time taken to report
f(S) after given al,..., an.
Definition 3 For a function f its (e, 6)-,space complexity, denoted Se, 3(f) is the minimum
over all (e, 6)-approximation algorithms A for f, of S(A). We similarly define UTE,6(f) and
QTE,(f) .
We will mostly be concerned with the space complexity of functions, since low space com-
plexity usually implies a reasonably low time complexity. Also, as we will see in Section 4,
there is an intimate connection between the space complexity of a streaming algorithm and
the communication complexity of a related problem.
One class of functions f we will focus on is the set of frequency moments of a data
stream.
Definition 4 The pth frequency moment is defined to be Fp = -iE[m] gi, where gi is the
sum of second coordinates of all pairs of the form
(i, Ui,1), (i, Ui,2), .--, (i Ui,)
where fi is the number of such pairs. If p = 0, we interpret 00 as 0, and thus Fo is the
number of distinct elements in S.
Remark 5 In most of the previous work on frequency moments, the setting considered was
a restricted cash register model with pairs of the form (j, 1) for j E [m] that appear in any
number of times in an arbitrary order. We will, however, handle the more general turnstile
model.
Chapter 3
Upper Bounds for Lp Distances
We describe our upper bounds for Lp, p > 2, as originally presented in an extended abstract
by Indyk and the author [46]. We will describe the upper bound by first giving an upper
bound for approximating the k-th frequency moment Fk in the restricted cash register data
stream model where we see a stream of pairs of the form (j, 1) for j E [m]. Later, we will
extend it to the turnstile model and make the connection from frequency moments to Lp
norms.
The earlier algorithms for estimating Fk were obtained by constructing a single estima-
tor, which was shown to equal Fk in expectation, and to have small variance. Our algorithm
departs from this approach. Instead, the main idea of our algorithm is as follows. First,
we (conceptually) divide the elements into classes Si, such that the elements in class Si
have frequency • (1 + E)i. We observe that, in order for the elements in Si to contribute
significantly to the value of Fk, it must be the case that the size si of Si is comparable to the
size of Si+1 U... U Slog.+ En. If this is the case, we have a good chance of finding an element
from Si if we restrict the stream to an ; 1/si fraction of universe elements, and then find
the most frequent elements in the substream. The contribution of Si to Fk can then be
approximately estimated by si - (1 + )izk. By summing up all estimated contributions, we
obtain an estimator for Fk.
Unfortunately, finding the most frequent element in a general stream (even approxi-
mately) requires storage that is linear in the stream size. However, if the distribution of the
stream elements is not very "heavy-tailed", then a more efficient algorithm is known [21].
This more efficient method is based on the sketching algorithm for F2 given in [2]. We show
that the streams generated by our algorithm (for Si's that contribute to Fk), satisfy this
"tail property", and thus we can use the algorithm of [21] in our algorithm.
A somewhat technical issue that arises in implementing the above algorithm is a need
to classify a retrieved element i into one of the classes. For this, we need to know fi.
This information is easy to obtain using a second pass. In the absence of that, we use the
estimation of fi provided by the algorithm of [21], but we define the thresholds defining the
classes randomly, to ensure that the error in estimating the frequencies is unlikely to result
in misclassification of a frequency.
Our algorithm will be implementable in 1-pass with space )(ml-2/k)poly(1/e). We do
not try to optimize the logarithmic factors or the poly(1/e) factors.
3.1 Preliminaries
We are given a stream S of n elements, each drawn from the universe [m]. Our goal is
to output an approximation to the kth frequency moment Fk. For simplicity, we assume
k > 2 is a constant (for k < 2, space-optimal algorithms already exist [2, 9]), while m, n, 1/c
may be growing. Let 0 < 6, e < 1 be the desired confidence and accuracy of our estimate,
respectively. We define the following parameters:
c > 0, e= c, a = 1+ , A = e/ak, L=
log n + 1
In the analysis we will often assume that c is a sufficiently small constant. W.l.o.g., we may
assume that m is a power of two and that n is a power of a. Unless otherwise specified,
logs are to the base a. We define the frequency classes Si, for 0 < i < log n, as
-= { < j <
We use the shorthand notation si for [ISIl. We say that a class Si contributes if
si. ik > LFk.
Lemma 6 If Si contributes, then si > L ECl> sl.
Proof: Since Si contributes,
sia i k > LFk > L s la lk > L swaik,
I l>i
and the lemma follows by dividing by aik.
We define FC to be the component of Fk. due to the contributing frequency classes, namely,
contributing Si jES
We define FkNC to be the component due to the non-contributing classes, so Fkc +FI c = Fk.
The next lemma shows that FkNC is small.
Lemma 7
F"! < AFk.
Proof: We note that if j E Si, then fj < a i+1. Therefore,
< I sia (i+1)A
< S sia
non-contr. Si
< ak E s8itik
non-contr. Si
(using the definition of Si)
< ak E LFk (using the definition of non-contributing Si)
non-contr. Si
< kk (log n + 1) (using the definition of L)
log n + 1
= AakFk.
We will also make heavy use of the following inequality.
Lemma 8 Let 0 < x < 1 and y > 1 be real numbers. Then,
(xy)2xy - < 12 - - (1 - x)1' <xy.
FkNC
Proof: For the lower bound,
> 1 - e- y
= 1- 1-xy
(using that 1 + z < ez for all reals z see, e.g., [57])
(xy)22 (using the Taylor expansion for e- xy)
(zy)2
Xy - +---2
S (xy)2
For the upper bound, we first show (1 - x) > 1 - xy. By monotonicity of the In(.) function,
(1 - x)Y > 1 - xy iff In(1 - x)Y > In(1 - xy). We use the Taylor expansion for In(1 + x),
that is, for Ix1 < 1 we have the expansion In(1 + x) = n+1. Then,
In( - ) = -y • i+l
i=1
Also,
ln(1 - xy) = - 0
i=1
We will have In(1 - 2)Y _ In(1 - xy) if for all i _ 1,
xi
-y----X >
i+1I -
(i+)
i+ 1
This holds provided yi-1 > 1, which holds for y > 1, as given by the premise of the lemma.
Thus,
1 - (1 - x)' • 1 - (1 - xy) zXy,
completing the proof.
Corollary 9 Let 0 < x < 1 and y > 1 be real numbers. Then,
(1- ) > (1 - xy).
Proof: This follows from the proof of the upper bound in the previous lemma.
1 - (1 - x)y
3.2 The Idealized Algorithm
We start by making the unrealistic assum.ption that we have the following oracle algo-
rithm. Later we remove this assumption by approximating the oracle with the Countsketch
algorithm of [21].
Assumption 10 For some B = B(m, n), there exists a 1-pass B-space algorithm Max that
outputs the maximum frequency of an item in its input stream.
We start by describing our algorithm which outputs a (1 + e)-approximation to Fk with
probability at least 8/9. The main idea is to estimate Fk by estimating each of the set sizes
si and computing Zi si a ik. Although in general it will not be possible to estimate all of the
si, we show that we can estimate the sizes of those Si that contribute. By Lemma 7, this
will be enough to estimate Fk. The space complexity will be B up to poly (I In n In m) terms.
The algorithm approximates si by restricting the input stream to randomly-chosen sub-
streams. By this, we mean that it randomly samples subsets of items from [m], and only
considers those elements of S that lie in these subsets. More precisely, the algorithm creates
b = O(ln ) families of R = 0 (E In (Inm log n)) substreams SJ, for j E [b] and r E [R].
We will assume that the constants in the big-Oh notation for both b and R are sufficiently
large in several steps in the analysis. For each r, S' will contain about m/23 randomly
chosen items. If a class contributes, we can show there will be some j for which a good
fraction of the maximum frequencies of the Sr come from the class. This fraction is used
to estimate the class's size.
We separate the description of the algorithm from its helper algorithm Estimate used in
Step 4. In Section 3.6 we will show how to choose the hash functions in Step 1 of the main
algorithm Fk-Approximator below.
We now describe Estimate. Define
r,j = (1 - (1 - 2-j) s).
Estimate computes an approximation fij to rij, and uses it to estimate si.
Lemma 11 The output of Estimate is non-negative.
Proof: Note that 0 _< fi,j and j Ž> 1. If i,j• 0 and i,ij < 1, then In(1 - ri,j) and
ln(1 - 2-j) are both negative, so the output of Estimate is positive. If rij, = 0, the output
is 0, and finally if •ij _> 1, the output of Estimate is 0 by definition. U
Fk-Approximator (stream S):
1. For j E [b] and r E [R], independently sample hash functions hr: [m] -- [2j ] using the
pseudorandom technique described in Section 3.6,
2. Let S~ be the restriction of S to those items x for which hj(x) = 1.
3. For each j, r, compute Mj = Max(Sj,).
4. For i = logn,..., 0,
(a) Find the largest j for which at least RL(1-e')E'/8 different r satisfy ai < Mr < ai+ 1
If no such j exists, set si = 0.
(b) Otherwise, set temp = Estimate(i, j, Clj>• , ~, M ,..., MR).
(c) If temp < L2j, set si = temp, otherwise set 'i = 0.
5. Output Fk = ,i siik"
Estimate (i,j, E4>i b l, Mj, ... , MjR):
1. Set Ai = #r for which ai M < i+1
2. Compute i, If < 1, output2. Compute ij - If-2ij < , output ln(1-22-) Otherwise, output 0.
"~ "'
3.3 Analysis
We first observe that if the si are good approximations to the si, then Fk is a good approx-
imation to Fk. More precisely, define the event E as follows:
* for all i, O < i < (1 + E)si, and
* for all i, if Si contributes, then 8i > (1 - E/(k + 2))si.
We claim that proving Fk is a (1 ± e)-approximation reduces to bounding the probability
that event £ occurs. More precisely,
Claim 12 Suppose that with probability at least q, event E occurs. Then with probability at
least q, we have IFk - Fk <5 EFk.
Proof: Assume E occurs. Put e* = e/(k + 2). Then,
S= ZE k < (1± + e)sioik (1 + E)Fk.
i i
For the other direction, write Pk =- C + .FkNoC, where Fkc denotes the contribution to Fk
due to the contributing Si. Then, assuming e' < e* by setting c to be sufficiently small,
kc  = iik
contributing Si
> (1 - *) i (ia +)k (using the definition of event E and e*)
contributing Si
(1- E*) FC
-_ 
k
(1 - e*)(1 - ak)
a Fk (using Lemmia 7 )
S(1-e*) - A Fk
(1- 6*)2
_ Fk (using the definition of A and e' < E*)
> (1 - E*)2 (1 - E*)kFk (definition of a and 1/(1 + e') > (1 - E') > (1 - e*))
> (1 - E*) 2 (1 - kE*)Fk (using Corollary 9)
> (1- (k + 2)e*)Fk (expanding, and dropping positive terms)
- (1 - E)Fk. (using the definition of E*)
Noting that Nc > 0 by Lemma 11. We conclude that with probability at least q, we have
IFk - FkI < EFk.
Our goal is now to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 13 For sufficiently large m, n, with probability at least 8/9, event £ occurs.
In the analysis we will assume the hr are truly random functions. This assumption will
be removed using the techniques of [441, and we wil describe how to do this in Section
3.6. It may also be possible to remove it by a slight modification of the inclusion-exclusion
approach used in [9], though we do not attempt that approach here. We start by showing
that with probability at least 8/9, a very natural event occurs. We then condition on this
event in the remainder of the proof.
Observe that in Estimate,
E[Ai,j] = R(1 - 2-j)Et>r s(1 - (1 - 2-)j) =) R(1 - 2-j)El> Srij .
We define F to be the event that for all Ai'j,
* If E[Ai,j] 2 RL(1 - e')e'/(16e), then IAj,j - E[Aisj] < LE[Ai,j].
* If E[Ai,j] RL(1 - e')e'/(16e), then Aij < RL(1 - ')e'/8.
Lemma 14 Pr[[F] > 8/9.
Proof: Fix any i,j for which E[Aij] > RL(1 - d)e'/(16e). By Chernoff bounds [57],
Pr[JAi,j - E[Ai,j]I > LE[Aij]] < e-e(L 2E[Aij,])
-e(L 3 R(1-e')E')
e-8(L3 R e')
e-8(ln(ln m log m))
S(In m log n
Now suppose Aij is such that E[Aij,] : RL(1 - e')e'/(16e). Then, using the fact that
RL(1 - E')E'/8 > 2eE[Ai,.], we may apply another Chernoff bound (see, e.g., Exercise 4.1
of [57]) to conclude
Pr[A,j Ž> RL(1 - e')e'/8 < 2 "- 'L( -) /
< 2-9(ln(ln m log m))
0 In m log n
where we have used the fact that e', L < 1. The lemma follows by a union bound over all i
and j, assuming the constant in the big-Oh notation defining R is sufficiently large. U
In the remainder, we assume that F occurs.
Definition 15 We say that temp is set if in step 4 of the main algorithm, temp is set to
the output of Estimate. We say that si is set if in step 4, 9i is set to temp.
For any stream Sj, the probability that a, Mr < ai1 is precisely
Pi,j = (1 - 2-j)E'> s'(1 - (1 - 2-j)s 8) - (1 - 2-j)Et>i'lri,j.
We would like to
Proposition 16
* If f,i - rij
* If rij - Fij
Proof: For lxj
approximate si by approximating Pi,j. We start with a few propositions.
Suppose si/L < 2i and 0 < 7 < 1. Let temp = ln(1-/i)"
5 yrij,, then temp - si • (y + O(L))si.
5 yri,j, then si - temp + (7 O(L))si.
< 1, we have the Taylor expansion ln(1 + x) = (-=o xn+. Thus,
ln( - 2- = (2j)+
n=OS(- 1)2n+1 (2-)l
(=2-j n+ln+1
n=0
(2 - n+1
n=1
So,
2- < - (1 - 2-J) < 2' J + 771,
27
where rq = 0(1/ 4 j). Similarly,
rij 
-- In(1 - rfj) < rij + n2,
where 12 = O(ijfj). Recall that rij ( = (1 - 2-j)*"). We want to deduce that sj2-J -
(si2-J)2/2) rij < si2-J. If si = 0 this is clear, since all three terms are 0 in this case.
Otherwise, since si is an integer, si > 1. As 0 < 1 - 2-1 < 1, we may apply Lemma 8 to
deduce that si2-j - (si2-j)2/ 2 < rij < sji2-j . Therefore,
2i(f,j + 772)
2i (fij + fij O(rij))
2Jri,j(1 + -y)(1 + O(ri,j))
si(1 + 7)(1 + O(ri,j))
si(1 + -y + O(L))
(using the definition of temp and our
(using the bound on ri,j)
(using the bound on rij)
(using that ri,J < si2- j )
(using that rij < s 2 - j < L).
Suppose now that ri,j - ri,j • yrij. Then,
temp > 2 (using the definition of temp and our bounds above)2--3 + 77,
2 (1 -)r2> -1 - )ri,j (using the new bound on ri,j)1 + 2Jr71
si(1 -y)(1 - si2-J/2)1 - y)(1 - (using that ri, > si2 - j - (si2-J) 2/2)
si(- - -)(1 - si2-l/2)
> .. (1 + 0( 2 -j) (using that qi = O(1/4j))
> si(1 - -)(1 - s2-J3/2)(1 - 0(2-j)) (using that 1/(1 + 0(2-j)) > 1 - 0(2-j))
> s(1 - y - O(L)) (using that si2-j < L and 2-i < L since si > 1),
where in the last step we may assume si > 1 since si is a non-negative integer, and if si = 0
the bound holds because of Lemma 11. U
Proposition 17 Suppose for some i and some 0 < 7 < 1/3, El>i s1 < (1 + y) El>i s1. If
temp is set for Si, then fiyj < (1 + -y + L)ri,j.
Proof: Put o- = E>i s, and or' Ej > 1t. In Estimate, ij - R ,j Also,
since temp is set, at least RL(1 - e')e'/4 different r satisfy a"i M < cai+ l. Therefore,
temp _•
K
_<
_<
_<
K
bounds above)
since we are conditioning on event F, we must have E[Ai,j] Ž RL(1 - e')e'/(16e), where
E[Ai,j] = R(1 - 2-3 ) ri,j3 . Moreover, since we are conditioning on F, this means that
-Aj - E[Ai.,jl] 5 LE[Ai$j].
Using the definition of Aij and dividing by R(1 - 2- j )' , we obtain,
fij < (1 + L)ri, (1- 2-J)"- '.
Using that a' < (1 + y)a,
fij < (1 + L)(1 - 2-j)`7frij.
Moreover,
(1 + L)(1 - 2-j)-'arij (1 + L)e"I/2'ri, (using that (1 - x)Y < e- xy for all reals x, y)
< (1 + L)e'/ 2rij, (using that a < 2j - 1)
Now, using the Taylor expansion for ey/ 2 and the fact that 7 < 1/3,
-y/2 00 (22) <) • i 7/2 <1 1 +
_ 
< 1- f y
i=O i=1
Thus, since we may assume L < 1/2 by setting the parameter c sufficiently small,
(1 + L)(1- 2-j)-T'rij • (1+ L)(1 + 3/5)ri,j (1 + L+37/5+ 3y/10)ri,j (1 + L + y)rij,
which completes the proof.
Our first lemma shows that we do not overestimate a class's size provided our estimates of
previous classes were not overestimated.
Lemma 18 Suppose for some i and some 0 < 7 < 1/3, -j>i s1 - (1 + 7) Ejl> sl. Then
0 • 9i < si + (7 + O(L))si.
Proof: If either temp or si is not set, then si = 0 and we're done. Otherwise, si = temp
and 2i > Ži/L. If si < si, since the output of Estimate is nonnegative by Lemma 11, we
have 0 < 9i < si. Otherwise, 2i >_ g/L > si/L. The conditions of the lemma together with
Proposition 17 imply that ij 5 (1 + -y + L)ri,j. Since 2i > si/L and 9i = temp, Proposition
16 implies that 9i <_ si + (- + O(L))si. U
Let p > 0 be a constant for which, for any y, 0 < 7 < 1/3, and ECl>i 1 < (1 + -y) •',> sl,
0 <_ s9i < si +- (y + tL)si. Such a •p exists by Lemma 18, and we can assume [p > 1, since
this can only make the inequality 9si < si + (-y + iL)si weaker.
Define 3i = M(log n + 1 - i)L for i = log n + 1,..., 0. We may assume for all i that
Oi + ~L < E. Indeed, for all i, pi <• /o = ((log n + 1)L = <iA M< e' = clte, using that
L = A/(log n + 1), A = el/ak < E', and e' ce. As L < ce, for all i, 3i + tL < 2cye, which
can be made less than e by setting c < 1/(21L). We will also assume that 0i < 1/3 for all i,
which we can also achieve by setting c to be sufficiently small.
We now use the previous lemma to show that in step 4 of the algorithm, we do not
overestimate the class sizes.
Lemma 19 For i = log n,..., -1,
0 < < (1)+ ) .
l>i i
Proof: For each i, the lower bound 0 1 •1>i i1 holds since for each 1, s1 > 0 by Lemma
11. To prove the upper bound, we induct downwards on i. In the base case, i = log n, we
have Ejl> 9i = E->j si = 0, and so the claim holds. We show the upper bound for some
i < log n assuming it holds for i + 1.
E§1 = §i+ E gl
>1i l>i
•5 9i + Es + ,8i+lE (by the inductive hypothesis)
l>i l>i
• si + (,i+1 + [L)si + s + ,3i+ 1 st (by Corollary 18)
l>i l>i
S s1 +3i a sl (using the definition of ij),
l>i l>i
which completes the induction and the proof of the lemma. U
The following corollary combines the two previous lemmas and shows the first condition of
event & holds.
Corollary 20 For all i, 0 < 9i • (1+ E)8i.
Proof: Lemma 19 implies that for all i, >lji •1 < (1+O÷-+1) l>i, sl. Since 0 < /ih+l < 1/3,
Corollary 18 implies that for all i, 0 < si < si + (13,+1 + pL)si. Since 3i+l + ItL < e for all
i, the corollary follows. U
The following lemma shows the second condition of event 8 holds.
Lemma 21 For a sufficiently small choice of the parameter c, which may depend on k, for
all i, if Si contributes, then si > (1 - e/(k + 2))si.
Proof: Define a = CEgi si and a' - 9l~>• . Choose j' for which si/(e'L) < 2j' <
2si/(e'L). To see that this is possible, we just need to check that there is a value of j' E [b]
for which si/(e'L) < 2j'. But si < m and b = O(ln -"), so by setting the constant in the
big-Oh notation defining b to be sufficiently large, we can find such a j'.
Recall that E[Ai,j,] = R(1 - 2-j')a(1 - (1 - 2-j')"i). Since a is a non-negative integer,
(1 - 2 -j')U > 1 - c/2J', since either a = 0 and we have equality, or we may apply Corollary
9. Since Si contributes, Lemma 6 implies that si > La. Thus, (1 - 2-j')a > 1 - si/(L2 ').
By our choice of j', s./(L2i') • e'. Thus, (1 - 2-j')a > 1 - e'.
Also, in particular, si > 0. Thus, applying Lemma 8, (1 - (1 - 2-j')Si) Ž s/2' -
(si/2j')2/2. By our choice of j', si/ 2i' e'L < 1, so s./2 j' - (si/2i')2/2 > si/2J'+l. By our
choice of j', si/23' +l > E'L/4, and so (1 - (1 - 2-i'),s ) > E'L/4.
Thus, E[Ai,j,] > RL(1 -e')'/4. Since we are conditioning on event F, and since L < 1/2
for a small enough setting of the parameter c,
Aij, > (1 - L)E[A,~j,] > RL(1 - c')e'/8.
Since Fk-Approximator chooses the largest value of j for which Ai,j _ RL(1 - e')e'/8, and
we have just shown there is one such value of j (namely, j = j), it follows that temp is set.
Let j be the value in Fk-Approximator for which temp is set. Then Ai,j Ž RL(1 - E')E'/8,
and since we are conditioning on F, this means that E[Ai,j] Ž RL(1 - e')e'/(16e), and
further that IA,j - E[Ai,j]I • LE[Ai,].
Thus,
Aij, > (1 - L)E[A,j] = (1 - L)R(1 - 2-i)frij,
and using the definition of fj,
fi,j > (1 - L)(1 - 2- )"'rij.
By Lemma 19, a' > 0, and thus
fi,j > (1 - L)(1 - 2-)'ri,j > (1 - L)(1 - e')ri,j = (1 - L - e')rij.
Note that j > j', and thus si/(e'L) < 2j and so si/L < 2j. Since also 0 < L + e' < 1, we
may apply Proposition 16 to infer that, temp > (1 - e - O(L))si.
We now show that si is set. This happens if temp < L23. This in turn happens if temp •
si/e'. We may assume that e' < 1/2 by setting the parameter c to be sufficiently small, and
therefore, this will happen if temp • 2s,. By Lemma 19, 0 < a' < (1 + +i 1)a. Using the
fact that 1i+:t < 1/3 and temp is set, Proposition 17 implies that fi,j 5 (1 + li+l + L)rij.
Since j > j', si/L < 2j, and therefore by Proposition 16, temp • (1 +, i+l + O(L))si. For a
sufficiently small choice of the parameter c, 1 + Ai+1 + O(L) _ 2, and therefore temp • 2si,
so that si is set. Thus, si = temp _ (1 - e' - O(L))si.
The last observation is that e' + O(L) E/ (k + 2) for a sufficiently small choice of the
parameter c. This completes the proof. U
Theorem 22 With probability at least 8/9, we have IFk - Fk < cEFk.
Proof: By Claim 12, this will follow if we show that with probability at least 8/9, event
& occurs. By Lemma 14, event F occurs with probability at least 8/9. Conditioned on F,
Corollary 20 and Lemma 21 hold, and this shows that 9 occurs. Thus, Pr[g] Ž 8/9. N
3.4 A 2-pass Algorithm
We instantiate Assumption 10 with the CountSketch algorithm of [211. We review it in the
next section, and then modify it for our application. We then describe how it can be used
in place of the Max oracle in Fk-Approximator in the following section.
3.4.1 CountSketch
In [21], the authors solve a problem that they call FindApproxTop(S, k, e):
* Given: an input stream S of length n with elements drawn from [m], an integer k,
and a real number e > 0.
* With probability at least 1 - rl, output a list of k elements from S such that every
element i in the list has frequency fi larger than (1 - e)nk, where nk is the kth largest
frequency of an item in S.
The following is Theorem 1 of [21]:
Theorem 23 The CountSketch algorithm solves FindApproxTop(S, k, e) in spacel
0((F ( In-+k lam .
In fact, the authors prove an additional property of their algorithm: with probability at
least 1 - rl, the list output by CountSketch satisfies the above and the additional property
that every element x with fx > (1 + e)nk occurs in the list.
Theorem 23 is not quite in the form we need, since the space required may be quite
large if nk is small. For our application, we would like the space to be independent of nk,
which we can do if we relax the proble(m FindApproxTop. Although our modification of
[21] is simple, we describe it here for completeness.
The algorithm is the same as described in [21]. There are t = O(ln n) hash functions
hi, h2 ,... , ht from [m] to [B'], for a parameter B', and t hash functions sl, s2,..., st from
[m] to {-1, 1}. The hi and si are pairwise independent, and can be represented using only
O(ln m) bits. We think of these hash functions as forming a t x B' array of counters. For
an element x E [m], we will use the notation c(hi(x)) to refer to the current count of the
hi(x)-th counter. Given a new stream element x, for each i E [t] we add to c(hi(x)) the
value si(x). For each item x E [m], we can estimate its frequency fx as follows:
fi = mediani{c(hi(x)) -si(x)}.
'In [21], the authors state that the space is O(tB + k), where t = 6(In 1) and B = f . This gives the
same bound that we state, up to the In m factor. The reason for the additional In m factor is that we are
looking at bit complexity, whereas [21] counted the number of machine words.
Indeed, observe that for any given i,
E[c(hi(x)) - s(x)]- E fysh(y)=i()f (y)si(x)
y ( fE[si(y)si(x)1
- fxs?(x)
fx,
where we have used the pairwise independence of the si. Thus c(hi(x)) si(x) is an unbiased
estimator, and the median is taken to reduce the variance of the estimator.
We need the following key lemma from [211, which we state without proof.
Lemma 24 (Lemma 4 of [21], restated) With probability at least 1 - 7/2, for all e E [n], if
q is the e-th item appearing in the stream and nq(e) is its frequency after the first e items,
jmedian{c(hi(q))si(q)} 
- nq(g)l 8 FB,
where c(hi(q)) refers to the value of the hi(q)-th counter after processing the first i items.
Given an input parameter B, we would like to use the lemma above to accomplish the
following two tasks with probability at least 1 - i for an input parameter q > 0:
1. Return all items x for which fsx V•.
2. For all items x that are returned, return an estimate fx for which fA • I•5 (1+ ) fe,
where 0 < n < 1/2 is an input parameter.
We accomplish these tasks as follows.
Our CountSketchFilter Algorithm
We modify CountSketch as follows. We refer to this new algorithm as CountSketchFilter.
Set the parameter B' = (4096/n 2)B. We keep a heap of the top B' items as we process the
stream. When we encounter an item x in the stream, if x is already in the heap, we update
the estimated frequency fx of x in the heap. If not, we compute fx and insert x into the
heap if it is larger than any of the B' items already in the heap, or if there are less than B'
items already in the heap.
In parallel, we also run the algorithm of [2] (see the remark after the proof of Theorem 2.2
of [2]) which gives a 2-approximation F2 (S) of F2(S) using space O((ln m + in inn) n l/7),
where 77/2 is the failure probability. We can assume by scaling that with probability at least
1 - 17/2,
2 F2(S) F2(S) 5 2F 2(S).
After processing all of the items in S, we remove all elements x from the heap for which
For those x still in the heap, we define the estimate
f = f+s 8 F
Analysis
Let 8 be the event that the event in Lemma 24 occurs, and also !F 2(S) < F2(S) 2F 2(S).
By a union bound, Pr[E] > 1 - 7. Let us condition on C occurring.
First Task: Suppose x is such that fx > .Then using that B' > 4096B,
8 F2 F< 2-
FB' -8 B
Thus,
-2>g-->-- ->•
Jx B'-8 81 B E8V B - 7Th
and so if x occurs in the heap, it will not be removed when we remove the elements y for
which fPA .
Now by Lemma 24, for any two elements x and y whose frequencies fx and fy differ by
more than 16 , their estimates correctly identify the more frequent item. Suppose x is
some item for which fx 2 - and x is not in the heap of the top B' items. Note that x
is clearly among the top B' items (in fact, the top B'/4096) in the stream. Moreover,
fx~ 2  > 64 F
EB- B1
Therefore, there must be some y for which fy < for which f > f. But
f if F28 F21 '
On the other hand,
fitŽfe-8 Ffx ý P 5>6B > f,
a contradiction. Thus, all x for which fx > arere turned, and we have accomplished
the first task.
Second Task: Using the definition of f, conditioning on event 8 occurring, if x is returned
then ix _ fx. Moreover, since x was returned we have
1 F 2E
-1 F2
2V2-
and thus since n < 1/2,
f : f - 8 1•21 FŽ
-2 V2-B - 8YV7-
> (2f2 - 1/2)
8
F 2EBB 1F IfB'4 B
Using the fact that B' = 4096B/n 2, we have
F216FE 16 4096B 4 B
Thus, since event 8 occurs,
i = fit+ 8
F2< f + 16
< A +KV-/
As fx > , it holds that fx < (1 + a)fx, and so we have accomplished the second task
as well.
Space Complexity: We need O(tB'lnmi) space to maintain the counters, and O(B'lnm)
space to maintain the heap. We also need O((ln m + In lnn) In 1/7) space to compute
F2(S). Recall that t = O(In ') and B' - 0(B).
The total space complexity is O(4 in m In in In n In 4). We summarize our discoveries
by the following theorem.
Theorem 25 Let 0 < 77 < 1 and 0 < K < 1/2. Given a stream S and a parameter B, there
is an algorithm CountSketchFilter that with probability at least 1 - r7, succeeds in returning
all items x for which f,2 > F2/B, no items x for which f2 < F2/(2B), and for all items x
that are returned, there is also an estimate fx provided which satisfies fx • Ix 5 (1 + ))fx.
The space complexity is 0( In m ln- + InInnln 4).
3.4.2 The new algorithm
We modify Fk-Approximator(S) as follows. In step 3 we invoke the algorithm CountSketch-
Filter of Theorem 25 on ST with parameters
B = O(bRml- 2/k), 7 = O(1/(bR)), n = 1/2.
We obtain lists Lr of candidate maxima for Sr. In parallel, we compute a 2-approximation
F2(S,) to F2(Sj) for each j and r. To do this, we runm the algorithm (see the remark
after the proof of Theorem 2.2 of [2]) which gives a 2-approximation F2(Sj) using space
O((ln m + n In n) In l/7q), where q is the failure probability. We assume ! 1/(9bR), which
can be made by setting the constant in! the big-Oh above to be less than 1/9.
Then, before invoking steps 4 and 5, we make a second pass over S and compute the true
frequency of each element of each Lj. Since the L¼ are relatively small, this is efficient. We
then prune the lists Lj by removing all items with squared frequency less than 2F2(Sjr)/B.
We set Mj to be the maximum frequency among the remaining items in Lj, if there is at
least one remaining item. Otherwise we set Mj = 0. At the end of the second pass, we
proceed with steps 4 and 5 as before.
3.4.3 Conditioning on a few natural events
To analyze the modified algorithm, we start by conditioning on the following event:
def91 f Vj,r, CountSketchFilter succeeds.
Lemma 26 Pr[9 1] 2 8/9.
Proof: This follows by our choice of tq and a union bound over all j E [b] and r E [R]. U
We also condition on the event:
def r, (S 9bR F2(S)
Lemma 27 Pr[G2] > 8/9.
Proof: We have E[F2(S)] = F2(S)/2:, so
Pr [F2(S r> 9bRF2 (S) 123 9bR
by Markov's inequality. By a union bound over all j E [b] and r E [R], we have
[9F(S bRF2(S)] 1Pr 3j, r I F2 (S ) 2i < -.-
Finally, define the event:
g3 =f Vj, r, . 5 2(S.) " 2F2(S)).
Lemma 28 Pr[[G3] 2 8/9.
Proof: We are running the F2-approximator of [2] in space O((ln m + In n) In 1/a), where
77 = 1/(9bR) is the failure probability. A union bound gives the lemma. U
Combining Lemma 14 with the previous three lemmas and a union bound, we have
Lemma 29 Pr[gl A G2 A G3] > 2/3.
In the remainder, we assume that 91 A G2 A G3 occurs. We need a few technical claims.
Claim 30 For all j, r, either Mjr is set to the maximumr frequency in Sr , or to 0.
Proof: Suppose for some j, r the pruned list Lj contains at least one element x of Si,
but does not contain the most frequent element y of S'r- Then, since G1 occurs,
2 2 (Sr)f < B
Since g3 occurs,
F9 (Sr) 2F2(45r)
which contradicts the fact that x wasn't pruned. U
Corollary 31 For all i, j, E[Ai,j] _ Rp,j.
Proof: Recall that in Section 3.3, we had E[Aij] = R(1 - 2-j)ari,j Rpi,j. After
instantiating Assumption 10 with CountSketchFilter, Claim 30 implies that Mj is what it
was before or 0. Thus, for each i, Aij cannot increase, and so after instantiating with
CountSketchFilter, E[Aij] • Rpij.
At this point we may define the event F as before, since the definition of F doesn't depend
on what the actual values of the E[Ai,.] are. All that matters is that for any fixed i, and
any j E [b], as we range over the r E [R], the events ai < Mj < ai+1 are i.i.d. Bernoulli
random variables, and Ai,j is the sum of indicators for these events. This allows us to apply
Chernoff bounds.
Thus, as before we define F to be the event that for all Aij,
* If E[Ai,j] 2 RL(1 - e')e'/(16e), then JAi,j - E[Aij]I < LE[Ai,j].
* If E[Aij] • RL(1 - E')E'/(16e), then Aj < RL(1 - E')e'/8.
Lemma 14 still holds with the same proof, and we have Pr[.] > 8/9. By a union bound,
Pr[F A G1 A g2 A G3] > 5/9. In the remainder, we assume that these four events all occur.
3.4.4 Walking through the previous proofs
Most of the arguments in Section 3.3 go through as before, though there are a few differences.
We carefully guide the reader through thle modified arguments. First, note that the lemmas
and corollary in Section 3.1 continue to hold, since they are independent of the algorithm.
Also, the only lemma in Section 3.2, Lemma 11 that states that the output of Estimate is
non-negative, continues to hold since this property is independent of the inputs to Estimate,
and the algorithm Estimate has not changed. Now we turn to the analysis in Section 3.3.
The definitions of Pi,j and ri,j remain unchanged.
We define & as before. Claim 12 that reduces correctness to bounding the probability
that event & occurs, continues to hold. As observed in Section 3.4.3, we may define YF as
before and Lemma 14 continues to hold. The definition of set for temp and .i, as given by
Definition 15, remains the same. Proposition 16, relating the estimate on the risj to the
value of temp, is the same as before. Indeed, this property does not depend on the fact that
the random variables Aai are now distributed differently.
We now reprove Proposition 17. We will need to make use of Corollary 31.
Proposition 32 Suppose for some i and some 0 < y < 1/3, ý,j>i i1 (1 + y) l,>i sj. If
temp is set for Si, then Fi,j < (1 + -y + L)rij.
Proof: Put a = Ej>isj, and a' = E••>i . In Estimate, fij = (-- . Also,
since temp is set, at least RL(1 - e')e'/4 different r satisfy a i < Mr < a i+ 1 . Therefore,
since we are conditioning on event F, we must have E[Aij] > RL(1 - e')e'/(16e), where
E[Ai,j] 5 Rpj, = R(1 - 2-' )rij by Corollary 31. Moreover, since we are conditioning on
F, this means that
IAj - E[A,j]|I < LE[At,j].
Thus, using the definition of Aij and these bounds, we have
FijR(1- 2-j)o" = Aij (1 + L)E[A,4j] < (1 + L)R(1- 2-j)ri,.
Dividing by R(1 - 2-j)a' we obtain,
fij 5 (1 + L)rij(1- 2-j) - '
Using that o' < (1 + y)a,
fi,j < (1 + L)(1 - 2-3)~l "ri J .
Moreover,
(1 + L)(1- 2-j)-ari,j • (1 + L)er"/2 jrj, (using that (1 - x)y < e- xy for all reals x, y)
< (1 + L)e0/2 ri, (using that a < 2j-1)
Now, using the Taylor expansion for e/d2 and the fact that y < 1/3,
?I-<1+y/6 =1+ <1 Y
i=O i=2 
10 5
Thus, since we may assume L < 1/2 by setting the parameter c sufficiently small,
(1 + L)(1- 2-j)- 7 ryid < (1 + L)(1 + 3y/5)rgiy • (1 +L+373/5+ 3y/10)rij 5 (1 + L+ )rij,
which completes the proof. U
Now, Lemma 18 continues to hold, but in the proof we replace Proposition 17 with Proposi-
tion 32. We may then define p > 0 and the fi as before. Moreover, Lemma 19 concerning the
inductive approximation of the "i continues to hold. Consequently, Corollary 20 continues
to hold, that is, the first part of event C continues to hold.
The main modification of this section is to Lemma 21, which we now reprove.
Lemma 33 For a sufficiently small choice of the parameter c, which may depend on k, for
all i, if Si contributes, then s9i > (1 - e/(k + 2))si.
Proof: For each j E [b] and r E [R], let UE be the indicator random variable for the event
that ai < MJ < ai+ 1. Note that the UJ are independent and identically distributed, and
that Aid = Ere[R] UJ. We start by showing that for any j' for which 2i' > si/(e'L), the val-
ues Ujr, are distributed just as under Assumption 10, that is, they are i.i.d. Bernoulli(pid,).
For this, it suffices to show that for an Si that contributes and j' for which 2/' 2 si/(e'L),
Vr E [R], if ai < Max(S,) < a"+1, then Max"(S',) Ž 4F 2(S,J)/B, (3.1)
where B = O(bRml- 2/k) is the parameter in CountSketchFilter. Then, by Theorem 25, and
the fact that CountSketchFilter succeeds because g1 occurs, the item x realizing Max(Sjr,)
will occur in L>,. Moreover, this will imply Max 2(S•,) > 2F 2(Sjr)/B, since Q3 occurs, and
therefore x will not be pruned from L,. In the second pass, the algorithm will then learn
that ai < fa < ai+ 1, and Ur = 1. Conversely, if we do not have a i < Max(S ,) < ai+ ,
then by Claim 30, Uj = 0.
To show (3.1), it suffices to show that for all x E Si and all r E [R], f2~ 4F 2(Sjr)/B.
Indeed, if it happens that ai < Max(S,,) < a i+ , then this will guarantee that Max 2 (S!') >
4F 2(Sj,)/B.
To show this, by H6lder's inequality (a generalization of the Cauchy-Schwartz inequal-
ity),
M 2/k M1 1-2/k
F2 = ' ) 1 k = F/km1-2/k. (3.2)
i=1 i=1 i=1
Since Si contributes, fksi >2 iksi > LF by definition. Therefore,
f22/k 2/k 2/k
F2L2/k
> ml 2/k (using (3.2))
2i'F 2(SJ,)L 2/k2 9bRml 2 /k (since 92 occurs)9bRml - 21k
2 '+1F2(ST,)L 2/k2+F()L/ (for a large enough constant in the big-Oh for B)
2i' +1F2 (Sj)L
> 2 ()L (since L2/k > L for k > 2)
Since k > 2, we have 2 + 1 /s/k > 2i'+1 /si. Moreover, our choice of j' is that 2Y' >
si/(e'L) 2 2s/lL, where the second inequality follows for a small enough setting of the
parameter c (to ensure E' < 1/2). Thus, 2 j '+l 1/ /k > 21 +/si 2 4/L. It follows that
2 '+ F2'(,) L 4F2(S,)L 4F 2(Sw,)fs2 > >
s2/kB L B B
as desired.
The rest of the proof is now the same as that of Lemma 21. Indeed, using the fact that
the Ui, are distributed just as under Assumption 10, for any j' for which 2j > si/(e'L), the
Aij, are also distributed just as under Assumption 10. Thus, an identical analysis shows
that temp is set with some value of j for which 2i > sil/('L), and temp > (1 - ' - O(L))si.
To see that 9i is set, we use the same analysis except instead of applying Proposition 21 to
infer that Fij < (1 + /i+1 + L)rij, we use Proposition 33. This completes the proof. U
Up to the pseudorandom technique to be described in Section 3.6, we now have a 2-pass
algorithm for Fk.
Theorem 34 Assuming there is access to an infinite random string, for any e, 6 > 0, there
is a 2-pass algorithm which (e, 6)-approximates Fk in space O(ml- 2/k)poly(1/e) ln(1/6).
Proof: With probability at least 5/9, F A •1 A 2 A GS occurs. In this case, Corollary 20
continues to hold, that is, the first part of event E holds. Moreover, Lemma 33 still holds,
and so E occurs. Thus, by Claim 12, Pr[l•k - Fkl $ EFk] > 5/9. Taking the median of
O(ln 1/6) independent repetitions makes the output an (e, 6)-approximation to Fk.
The algorithm is a 2-pass algorithm. In our total space calculation, we will suppress
a poly(lnln m, ln ln n, In 1/e) factor. Since we have an infinite random string, the random
functions chosen in step 1 of Fk-Approximator do not contribute to the space complexity.
Fk-Approximator invokes CountSketchFilter O(bRln 1/6) times, which by Theorem 25 uses
space O(Blnmlnn/77)) in each invocation, up to a Inlnn factor. Here, B = O(bRml- 2/k)
and r7 = O(1/(bR)). This has total space
O (QbRlnl bRml-2/klnmln(nbR) = O (m-2/kb2R21nmln(nbR)ln .
The algorithm also invokes the 2-approximation algorithm for F2 of [2] a total of bR In 1/6
times. This has total space
0 bR(lnm+lnlnn)ln ln) =O bR(lm+ lnlnn)ln(bR)In ).
The second pass, where we compute the true frequencies of the elements in the Lr, can be
done with space
0 B bRln) Inm = O B bRln I) nm) =O (m-2/kb2Rn 1
Thus, the total space is,
S(m1-2/kb2R2 Inmln(nbR) lI + O (bR(In m + lnlnn) ln(bR) In
Note that since k is constant, ak is constant, and so we can bound the parameter L as
follows. Recall that we have defined log n to be log1+a n, which is just O (inn).
( LA e(1 ) e ( en e ( I () + a )) = (E2
log n O k  log n ggl+ n In n In n .
Now, recall that b = O(ln -) and R = O (•-•s In (Inmlog n)). Using our bound on L,
b=O (lnm+ln +Lnlnn),
and
R =O -- in In m + In In n + In -
Suppressing a poly(Ilnln m, In In n, n 1/) factor, b = O(lnm) and R = O(1,3n). Moreover,
In b and In R are 0(1) if we suppress such a factor. Thus, suppressing such a factor, the
total space is:
O (ml-2/kb2R21nmnnln + O bR(nm + lnlnn)n .
The first term dominates, and so up to a poly(ln In m, In In n, In 1/e) factor, the space is
0 (ml-2/kb2R2 In m ln n = / ln3mln7nln ,
and the theorem follows. U
3.5 The 1-pass Algorithm
In this section we show how to remove the second pass from the algorithm in the previous
section, and obtain a 1-pass algorithm. We will again assume the existence of an infinite
random string, and remove this in Section 3.6.
Recall that, in the previous section, the algorithm assumed an oracle that we refer to as
Partial Max. For each stream Sj and a certain value of a threshold T (namely, for a given j
and r we set the threshold T = 2F 2(S,)/B), the oracle reported the element i* E [m] with
the maximum. value of fe., but if and only if fi. > T. The second pass was needed in order
to compute the exact frequencies of the candidate maxima, and check if (a) any of them
was greater than T and (b) find the element with the maximum frequency.
We reduce the need of the second pass by transforming the algorithm in such a way
that, if we replace each frequency fi by its estimation Ji provided by Countsketch Filter, the
behavior of the transformed algorithm is, with high probability, the same as in the original
algorithm.
Let r = o(1l) be a function to be determined. Since there are O(bRlnl/6) invoca-
tions of CountSketch Filter, if qi = o(1/(bRl n 1/6)) in the premise of Theorem 25, then with
probability 1 - o(1l), for all invocations of CountSketchFilter and for all items i reported by
CountSketchFilter in each invocation,
Si (1 + ) .
We assume this event occurs in the rest of this section. The transformations are as follows.
Shifted boundaries: We modify the algorithm so that the thresholds T passed to Partial
Max are multiplied by some value y E [1, a), and the frequency boundaries ai are multiplied
(consistently) by some value x E [1/a, 1). The algorithm and its analysis of correctness can
be easily adapted to this case. This requires natural adjustments, such as replacing each
term a• in step 5 of Fk-Approximator in the estimator by (xa) i . The other modifications
are to the calls CountSketchFilter(S,) in step 3 of Fk-Approximator.
The reason for this modification is that, if we choose x, y independently at random from
a near-uniform distribution, then, for Afied i, the outcome of comparisons, say, fi Ž yT and
fi. yT, is likely to be the same, as long as fi and fi differ by a small multiplicative factor.
Class reporting: We replace the Partial Max oracle by another oracle, called Rounded
Partial Max, which does the following: for a permutation 7r : [m] --+ [m], it reports i with the
smallest value of 7r[i] such that fi is in the same frequency class as fi., but only if fi. > yT.
The algorithm and its analysis remain unchanged, since it only performs comparisons of fi
with values xa3 and yT.
In the following we assume ir is choosen uniformly at random from the set of all permu-
tations of [m]. Later, we show how to reduce the required randomness by choosing 7r from
a family of 2-approximate min-wise independent functions [43].
Approximate frequencies: Now we consider the fbllowing key modification to Rounded
Partial Max. The modification replaces the use of the exact frequencies fi by their approxi-
mations fi. Specifically, we replace each comparison fi > v by a comparison fA > v(1 + K).
Note that f >_ v(1 + I.) implies fi > v. Call the resulting oracle Approximate Max.
Let i' be such that 7r(i') is the smallest value of n(i) over all i for which fi is in the
same frequency class as fi*, and let [xa k', ak'+1) be the frequency class containing fi*. If
we invoke Rounded Partial Max with parameters j, r, we denote the values i', i*, k' , T by
i'(j, r), i*(j, r), k'(j, r) and T(j, r). Consider the following event B(j, r):
1. fi'(j,r) Zxak'(jr) (1 + K), and
2. fi*(j,r) > yT(j, r) •= fi*(j,r) > yT(j, r)(1 + r.)
This event allows us to use the approximate frequencies provided by CountSketchFilter in
lieu of the actual frequencies. The following is easy to verify.
Claim 35 Fix the random bits of Fk-Approximator. If B(j, r) holds for all j, r, then the
behaviors of all invocations of Rounded Partial Max and Approximate Max, respectively, are
exactly the same. Therefore, the output of Fk-Approximator using either oracle is the same.
Now it suffices to show that each B(j, r) holds with good probability. We show that this
holds even if -r is chosen from a family of 2-approximate min-wise permutations i.e., such
that for any A C [m], a E [m] - A, we have Pr,[4r(a) < minbEA ir(b)] < 2. Such families
exist and are constructible from only O(log2 m) random bits [43].
Lemma 36 'There is a distribution of x so that, for any 0 < C < 1, if 0 < r < 1 < a =
1 + e' < 2, then for a fixed pair (j, r) the probability of
f',(i,r) < za"k' (j,)(1 + t)
is at most O(/e' . log m -1/( + (). Moreover, this fact holds even if r is chosen at random
from a family of 2-wise functions.
Proof: For simplicity, we are going to omit the pair (j, r) in the notation below.
For a parameter 3, define I'(,3) = I{i : 3 fi}, and I" = I{i : 3 < fi < 3(1 + K)}.
Consider 3 = xak'. Observe that the event we are concerned in this lemma occurs if
i' e I"(13).
We choose x = (1+rn)/a, where s is chosen uniformly at random from {0,.. ., log, + , a}.
Note that logl+, a = E(e'/K).
Observe that the value of 3 ranges in [fi /o,..., fi]. Also, observe that each value in
that interval is assumed at most once (that is, for only one value of x).
Claim 37 For any 0 < ( < 1, the number of different values of 3 such that I"(3)/I'(3) 2 (
is at most logl+¢(m + 1) + 1 = O(logm/c).
Proof: Assume this is not the case, and let 1,...,3t, t > logl+ (m + 1) + 1 be the
different values of 3 such that I"(3)/I'(13) > 4, in decreasing order.
Since I'(3) = 1"(0) + I'(,3(1 + x)), we have that for each 0i, I'(3i) > _ I'(3i(1 + K)) _
(1 +)I'(P(1+ )). Moreover, the value of I'(13) does not decrease as 3 decreases. It follows
that I'(t) 2 (1 + )t-1' > m, which is a contradiction. E
Thus, for the value 3 induced by a random choice of x, the probability that I"(3)/I'(0) >
( is at most O(K/e'logl+( m). The probability that i' belongs to I"(3) is at most C (if 7r
is a truly random permutation) or at most 2( (if 7r is chosen from 2-approximate min-wise
independent family). U
The other part of the event B(j, r) can be handled in a similar way. By setting 4 =
/' E- loggm we get,
Lemma 38 The probability that some event B(j, r) does not hold is at most
O(Rb K/.e -lognm)
which is o(1) for small enough K = 1/(1/e' + log m)°(1)
3.6 Reducing the Randomness
It remains to show that the functions h. used by our algorithm can be generated in small
space. To this end, we will use Nisan's pseudorandonm generator (PRG), as done in [44].
Specifically, observe that the state maintained by algorithm consists of several counters c
(as in the CountSketch algorithm). Each counter is identified by indices j, r and i. Given
a new element x, the counter performs the following operation: if h (x) = 1 and g(x) = i,
then c = c + Yx.
Therefore, we can use Lemma 3 of [44], to show that the random numbers hr(0),... hr(m-
1) can be generated by a PRG using only O(log2(nm)) truly random bits as a seed. Thus,
the total number of random bits we need to store is bounded by the total storage used by
our 1-pass algorithm times O(log(nm)).
Wrapping Up: At this point we have proven the correctness and efficiency of our 1-
pass algorithm in the restricted cash register model where the input consists of pairs of
the form (x, 1). Note that the algorithm can easily be modified to handle the cash register
model where the input consists of pairs of the form (x, z) where z is a positive integer.
Indeed, instead of adding 1 to the appropriate counters, we simply add z. That is, CountS-
ketchFilter is easily seen to be implementable in the (unrestricted) cash register model. In
fact, Fk-Approximator is even correct in the turnstile model. This again follows from the fact
that CountSketch and CountSketchFilter can be implemented in the turnstile model. That
is, when seeing a pair (x, z) E [m] x 71, we find the hi(x)-th counter for each i E [t]. We
then add to c(hi(x)) the value z -si(x), for each value of i. The analysis proceeds as before.
Theorem 39 There is a 1-pass )(ml 2/P)poly(1/e) -space streaming algorithm for (1 +e)-
approximating the Lp norm of an m-dimensional vector presented as a data stream for any
p > 2. This also holds for the frequency moments Fp.
Chapter 4
Lower Bounds for Lp Distance and
Frequency Moments
4.1 Communication Complexity
Here we review a few notions from communication complexity. We closely follow the pre-
sentation in the book by Kushilevitz and Nisan [53]. The interested reader may consult [53]
for more detail.
Let f : X x y -+ {0, 1} be a Boolean function. We. will consider two parties, Alice and
Bob, receiving x and y respectively, who try to compute f(x, y). For non-trivial f, Alice
and Bob will need to communicate with each other to evaluate f(x, y). The communication
is carried out according to some fixed protocol II, which depends only on f.
In each round of the protocol, H must determine whether the protocol terminates or if
not, which player should speak next. If the protocol terminates, it must specify an answer
(that is, f(x, y)). This information must depend only on the bits communicated thus far,
as this is the only information common to both parties. Also, if it is a party's turn to
speak, the protocol must specify what the party sends, and this must depend only on the
communication thus far and the input of the party.
We are only interested in the amount of communication between Alice and Bob. We
thus allow Alice and Bob to be computationally unbounded. The cost of a protocol II on
input (x, y) is the number of bits communicated by IT on (x, y). The cost of a protocol II
is the maximal cost of II over all inputs (x, y). This is formalized as follows.
Definition 40 A protocol 1H over domain X x Y with range Z is a binary tree where
each internal node v is labeled either by a function a, : X -- {0, 1} or by a function
b, : Y -+ {0, 1}, and each leaf is labeled with an element z E Z.
The value of a protocol H on input (x, y) is the label of the leaf reached by starting
from the root, and walking on the tree, At each internal node v labeled by a, walking left
if av(x) = 0 and right if av(x) = 1, and at each internal node labeled by b, walking left if
b,(y) = 0 and right if b,(y) = 1. The cost of H on input (x,y) is the length of the path
taken on input (x, y). The cost of the protocol H is the height of the tree.
Definition 41 For a function f : X x Y -+ Z, the deterministic communication complexity
of f, denoted D(f), is the minimum cost of H, over all protocols H that compute f.
Note that we always have D(F) • min(log 2 |Xl,log 2 IYI) + 1.
We will be mostly interested in the setting where both parties have access to random
coins. Here, Alice has access to a randorn string rA and Bob has access to a random
string rB. Here the random strings are of arbitrary length, and are chosen independently
according to some probability distribution. Now when we look at the protocol tree, Alice's
node are labeled by arbitrary functionis of x and ra, while Bob's nodes are labeled by
arbitrary functions of y and rB. Every combination of x, y, rA, and rB determines a leaf of
the protocol tree with a specified output. The difference now is that for some inputs (x, y)
and some choices of rA and rB, the protocol may output the wrong answer. We say that a
protocol H computes a function f with 5-error if for every (x, y),
Pr[II(x, y) = f(x, y)] > - 6.
Our measure of communication cost is as follows.
Definition 4:2 The worst case running time of a randomized protocol H on input (x, y) is
the maximum number of bits communicated for any choice of the random strings, rA and
rB. The worst case cost of H is the maximum, over all inputs (x, y) of the worst case
running time of H on (x, y).
We note that it is also possible to define the cost with respect to average, rather than
worst-case random strings, though we do not take this up here. We can now defined the
randomized communication complexity of a function.
Definition 43 Let f : X x Y --- {O, 1} be a function. Then for 0 < 6 < 1/2, R6 (f) is
the minimum worst case cost of a randomized protocol that computes f with error 6. We
denote R(f) = R1/ 3 ().
Note that for any two constants 6,6' with 0 < 6,6' < 1/2, we have R6 (f) = O(R,(f)), so
it is w.l.o.g. that we fix R(f) = R1/ 3 (f). Indeed, given a protocol with error probability
6 > 6', we may repeat it O(log 1/6') times, using independently chosen random strings each
time, and take the majority output. This operation defines a new protocol which errs at
most an 6' fraction of the time (for every input).
In many of the protocols we consider, we have an even simpler model. Namely, Alice
computes some function A(x) of x and sends the result to Bob. Bob then attempts to
compute f(x, y) from A(x) and y. Here only one message is sent, and it is from Alice to
Bob.
Definition 44 Let f :X x Y -- {0, 1} be a function. Then for 0 < 6 < 1/2, the 6-error
1-way randomized communication complexity R -'ay (f) is the minimum worst case cost of
a randomized protocol that computes f with error 6, in which only a single message is sent
from Alice to Bob. We denote R-way( f) = R 1-way (f•
As defined, in a randomized protocol Alice and Bob each have random strings but they
do not have any random bits in common. We could have instead allowed the parties to
have a "public" coin, so that both parties can see the results of a single series of random
coin flips. More precisely, there is a common random string r (chosen according to some
distribution) and in the protocol tree Alice's communication corresponds to function of x
and r and Bob's communication corresponds to functions of y and r. This can be viewed
as a distribution {II,}r over determinist-ic protocols.
Definition 45 A public coin protocol is a probability distribution over deterministic pro-
tocols. The success probability of a public coin protocol on input (x, y) is the probability of
choosing a deterministic protocol, according to the distribution of r, that computes f(x, y)
correctly. We let Rfub(f) be the minimum cost of a public coin protocol that computes f
with an error of at most 6 on every input (x, y). We denote Rpub (f) R7(f).
Clearly R'ib(f) < R 6 (f) since the parties can use a public coin to define their individual
private coins. In fact, there is a close coniverse due to Newman.
Theorem 46 ([62]) Let f : {0, 1}" x {0, 1}m -+ {0, 1} be a function. For every 6,6' > 0,
Rs+ ,(f) R"b(f ) +O(log m +log 1/6'). This continues to hold if both protocols are 1-way.
Throughout we have been discussing protocols which, for every input (x, y), err with prob-
ability at most 6, where the probability is only over the random strings of the protocol. It
is sometimes natural to look at protocols which err on a certain fraction of inputs.
Definition 47 Let / be a probability distribution on X x Y. The (p, 6)-distributional com-
munication complexity of f, DA,b(f), is the cost of the best deterministic protocol that gives
the correct answer for f on at least a 1 - 6 fraction of all inputs in X x Y, weighted by p.
We denote DA(f) = DA,1/3(f).
A famous theorem, known as Yao's Minimax Principle, relates D,,6(f) to R ub(f).
Theorem 48 ([71])
R~" (f) = max D,,(f).
Furthermore, the same relationship holds for 1-way protocols.
One of these directions is quite easy to prove, as we now show.
Lemma 49 D,,1(f) < RTb(f) for any distribution p., and this also holds if both protocols
are 1-way.
Proof: If Hl is a randomized protocol realizing R6 (f), then for all inputs x, y, we have
Pr[II(x,y) f f(x,y)] < 6. This means that Pr(x:,y)),[Prcoins ofn[II(x,y) 4 f(x, y)]] < 6,
and by switching the order of summations we have
Pr [ Pr [I(x, y) ff(x, y)]] Ecoins of Pr [II(x,y) # f(x,y)] < 6.
coins of fl (x,y)- ,)
So we can fix a certain random string of II, making it a deterministic protocol realizing
DA,6(f).
We will also need to extend the above definitions to handle relations rather than just
functions. Hlere we have a relation T C X x Y x Z. The communication problem is the
following: Alice is given x E X and Bob y E Y, and their task is to find some z E Z for
which (x, y, z) c T.
Definition 50 A protocol II computes a relation T if for every legal input (x, y) E X x Y,
the protocol reaches a leaf marked by a value z such that (x, y, z) E T. The deterministic
communication complexity of a relation T. denoted D(T), is the number of bits sent on the
worst case input (legal or illegal) by the best protocol that computes T. The definitions of
R6(T), R'-waY(T), R b (T), and D, 6(T) are similar.
We will mostly consider a special type of relation, known as a promise problem. Here
Z = {0, 1} and we have disjoint subsets Pve. and Pn,, of X x Y. The relation T is such that
if (x, y) E Pyes, then (x, y, 1) E T but (x, y,O)  T. If (x, y) E Pno, then (x, y, 0O) E T but
(x, y, 1) ý T. If (x, y) Pyes U Pno, then both (x, y, 0) and (x, y, 1) are in T.
The following is our generalization of Lemma 49 to promise problems.
Lemma 51 Let T be a promise problem with sets Pye,, and Pno. Let g : X x y --+ {0, 1} be
any function for which for all (x, y) E Ples, g(x, y) = 1, and for all (x, y) E Pno, g(x, y) = 0.
For any distribution pI on X x Y,
Rb" (T) _ D,,& (g),
where 6' = + P6(Pyes n Pno,). This also holds if both protocols are 1-way.
Proof: Let II be a randomized protocol realizing R6(T). Then for all inputs (x, y) E Pyes,
Pr[lI(x, y) = 1] > 1 - 6, and for all inputs (x, y) E Po,, Pr[HI(x, y) = 0] > 1 - 6. Thus,
Pr [ Pr [I1(x, y) # g(x, y)] I (x, y) E Pyes U Pno]
(x,y)~p coins of II
- Pr [ Pr [(x, y, II(x, y)) ý T] I (x, y) E Pyes U Pno]
(x,y)•pz coins of 1
< 6.
Thus,
Pr [ Pr [II(x, y) g(x, y)] < Pr [ Pr [(x, y, II(x, y)) 0 T] I (x, y) E Pyes U Pno]
(X,y)-p coins of HI (x,y)'r coins of I
+ Pr [(x, y) 0 Pyes U Pno]
< 6 + p(Pye. n P,).
By switching the order of summations we have
Pr [ Pr [II(x, y) g(, y)]] = Ecoins of n Pr [I(x,•y) g(x, y)] 6 + p(Pyes n P).
coins of II (x,y)>/' (••Y);
We can fix a random string of II, making it deterministic with Pr(x,y)~, [II(x, y) # g(x, y)] <
6 + p(P5yes n Pno). U
In everything that follows we will assume that protocols are public-coin, since this will only
change the communication complexity by an additive O(log m), which will be negligible.
We will omit the superscript pub for simplicity.
4.2 The Gap Hamming Problem
In our lower bounds, we are particularly concerned with the c-Gap-Hamming distance
promise problem, denoted c-GH.
Definition 52 In the c-GH problem X - {0, 1}1, Y - {0, 1}m, Pyes = {(x, y) I A(x, y)
m/2 + cvm}, and P,,o = {(x, y) I A(x,y) < m/2 - cri}. Here, c > 0 is allowed to depend
on m.
This relation captures the communication complexity of approximating the Hamming dis-
tance. Indeed, consider the following relation T, C {0, 1}m x {0, 1}m x {0, 1, 2,..., m}
defined as follows: (x, y, z) E T, iff (1 - e)A(x, y) < z < (1 + e) A (x, y).
Lemma 53 D(Te) > D(Vefm-GH), R(T,) > R(fc-i-GH), Rl-way(T,) > RI-way(,/e-
GH), D,(T,) 2 D,(cv/m-GH).
Proof: Let II be a protocol for the eVmi-GH problem which behaves as follows. Let
H' be a protocol for T,. On input (x, y), II invokes 1' to obtain an answer z. If z >
m/2, II(x,y) = 1, else H(x,y) = 0. The (deterministic, randomized, randomized 1-way,
distributional) communication cost of 1 is that same as that of II'.
To analyze the correctness of H, observe that for the ex/_-GH problem we have Pyes =
{(x, y) I A(x, y) Ž m/2 + em} and P, ,- {(x, y) I A(x, y) < m/2 - em}. Suppose (x, y) E
Pes. In this case (x,y,z) E T6 iff (1 - e)A(x,y) < z < (1 + )A(x, y). In particular
(1 - e)(m/2 + cm) = m/2 + cm - ?m/2 - e2 m = ni/2 + (1 - 2e)em/2 > m/2. Now
suppose (x, y) E P,,. Then if (x, y, z) E Te, z < (1 + e)A(x, y) 5 (1 + e)(m/2 - em) =
m/2 - em + em/2 - e2 m < m/2 - em/2 < m/2. Thus, 1I is correct for e/ý/-GH whenever
Il' is correct for TE. The lemma follows. U
For general Lp norms for arbitrary real numbers p > 0, we may consider the relation Tp,, C
{0,1, 2,... r}m x {0,1,2,...,r}m -+ {0,1,2,..., [mrP]} defined as follows: (x,y,z) E Tp,E
iff (1 - E) x - yl | < z < (1 + e)I ix - yJ, I. Observe that if x, y have coordinates either 0 or
1, then |Ix - y|- = A(x,y). We thus have,
Lemma 54 For allp Ž 0, D(Tp,e) Ž D(efi-GH), R(Tp,,) 2 R(e/-m-GH), Ri-WaY(Tp,E) >
R1-waY(EVi-GH), D,(Tp,,) 2 Dfl(ev -GH). Here we take To,E = TE, i.e., we consider
the Hamming distance when p = 0.
Let c > 0 be an arbitrary constant. We need the following reduction from c-GH on inputs
of length m' = c2/E2, denoted c-GHm, to ev-m-GH on inputs of size m, denoted ev/m-
GHm. Here, w.l.o.g., we assume that C2/e2 is an integer. We will only be interested in
the randomized 1-way communication complexity, though the statement also holds for the
other notions of complexity we have considered.
Lemma 55 For any e •, R1-way(~V--GHm) > RI-way(1-GHm,).
Proof: Given an input (x, y) to c-GHme, we create x' by replacing each bit xi of x
with a block of e2m/c 2 bits all of value xi. Do the same operation to obtain y' from
y. Then 2x'l = ly'| = m. If A(x,y) > m'/2 + cVri, then A(x',y') 2 m/2 + em. If
A(x, y) < m'/2 - cV/-, then A(x', y') < m/2 - Em. Thus, running a randomized 1-round
protocol for ev i-GHm and outputting whatever it outputs yields a randomized 1-round
protocol for c-GHm, with the same properties. U
Combining the previous two lemmas,
Corollary 56 For any e > - and any p Ž 0, Rl-waY(Tp,E) > R1-way(1-GHm,).
We will later see that Ri-way(1-GH,,,) = f(1/c2 ), and thus the restriction that e >2
is necessary. Indeed, the trivial protocol in which Alice just sends her input to Bob has
communication m.
Next we state some bounds on the communication complexity of c-GH.
Theorem 57 For any constant c > 0, D(c-GH) = P(m).
Proof: We reduce from the equality function EQ: XxY -+ {0, 1} defined by EQ(x, y) = 1
iff x = y. We need the fact that there is a constant ( > 0 and an encoding C : {0, 1 }m/6
{0, 1}m/2+(m/2 such that for any distinct x, y E {0, 1)m/6, A(x, y) > (m (see, e.g., [67]).
We consider the setting 1Ix = lYl = mn/6. It is known that in this case D(EQ) = Q(m) (see,
e.g., [53]).
Given an instance (x,y) of EQ with |xi = |y| = m/6, the parties compute C(x) and
C(y), respectively, which are of length m/2 + Cm/2. Let m' = m/2 - Cm/2. Alice creates
x' E {0, 1}m by padding x with m' trailing zeros. Bob creates y' E {0, 1}m by padding y
with m' trailing ones. If x = y, then A(x', y') = m' = m/2 - Cm/2 < m/2 - cvvr' for
any constant c. If x Z y, then A(x', y') > m' + (m = rn/2 + Cm/2 > m/2 + cv-mi for any
constant c. Thus, any deterministic protocol II which solves c-GH for any constant c on
inputs of size m, also solves EQ on inputs of size m/6. Thus, D(c-GH) = Ql(m). U
Theorem 58 ([5]) For any constant 0 < c < 1/v-, R(c-GH) = R( • .
Proof: We reduce from the disjointness function DIS : X x --+ {0, 1} defined by
DIS(x, y) = 1 iff there is an i E [m] for which xi -z yi = 1. It is known [50, 64] that
R(DIS) = Q(m). Actually, it is known that even for the restriction to the case when
wt(x) = wt(y) = m/4, the disjointness function has Qf(m) randomized complexity [64].
This is what we'll reduce from.
Let m' = 2cVmf, which we assume is a multiple of 4. Given an instance (x, y) of DIS
with x12 = lyl = m' and wt(x) = wt(y) = m'/4, the parties do the following. Alice first
replaces each bit xi of x with a block of V'•/(2c) - 1 bits, all of which equal xi. She then
pads this with a block of 2cv/i- zeros, to obtain x'. Similarly, Bob replaces each bit yi of y
with a block of v/-/(2c) - 1 bits, all of which equal yi. He then pads this with a block of
2c/-m ones, to obtain y'. Note that 2Ix' = y'| = m.
If DIS(x, y) = 0, then A(x', y') = (m'/2)-(xVf/(2c) -1)+2cV/• = m/2-cv'i+2c--/i =
m/2 + c/--m-. If DIS(x, y) = 1, then A(x', y') = (m'/2 - 2) - (.V/(2c) - 1) + 2cV/' =
m/2 + cV'i -- Vnrl//c + 2 < m/2 + cVi i - 3cVm' + 2 since c < 1/v". The latter is at most
m/2 - cvm for sufficiently large m. Thus, any randomized protocol IH which solves c-GH
on inputs of size m must have communication complexity (t( m/). U
The main open question here is whether R(c-GH) = 0(m) for constant c. We will prove
this is true for 1-round protocols. This is of major importance to streaming algorithms,
where the streaming algorithm is usually assumed to only have one pass over the data
stream. Here we formalize the connection between this problem and streaming algorithms
for approximating Fp, as discovered by the author [68] (and earlier for Fo by Indyk and
the author [46]). We show the lower bound holds even in the cash register model for data
streams.
Theorem 59 For all p 74 1 and any constants e, 6 > 0, S~',6(Fp) > R1-way(1-GHm,) -
O(log 1/e), where e' = E/(2P-1 - 1) and m' = 1/E2 .
Proof: We use an (c', 6)-approximation algorithm for Fp in the streaming model to
build a protocol for 1-GHm,. Alice chooses an arbitrary stream a. with characteristic
vector x E {0, 1}m', and Bob chooses an arbitrary stream ay with characteristic vector
y E {0, 1}m '.Note that the universe the stream elements are drawn from is [m'], and the
meaning is that i occurs in ax iff xi = 1 (and similarly for ay and yi).
Let M be an (e, 6) Fp-approximation algorithm for some constant p = 1. Alice runs M
on ax. When M terminates, she transmits the state S of M to Bob along with wt(x). Bob
feeds both S and ay into his copy of M. Let FP be the output of M. The claim is that F!p
along with wt(x) and wt(y) can be used to solve Tp,,. We first decompose Fp:
Fp(ax o ay) = E fl
= 2Pwt(x A y) + 1•A(x, y)
= 2p-(wt(x) + wt(y) - A(x, Y)) + A(X, y)
= 2~-(wt(x) + wt(y)) + (1 - 2P-')A(x, y).
and thus, for p 7 1.
2P-1 Fp(ax o ay)A(x,y) (wt(x) + wt(y)) - o aW)2p-1 ý1 2P--
For p =/ 1, define the quantity E to be
2P-1(wt(x) + wt(y)) M_ (ax o ay)
1 - 2f - 1  .1 - 2p- 1
If E > m'/2, Bob decides that A(x, y) > m'/2 + v/W, and otherwise Bob decides that
A(x, y) < m'/2 - v7-. We now analyze correctness. Suppose M outputs a (1+ e') approx-
imation to Fp(a, o a%).
Case 1: Suppose A(x, y) > m'/2 + VrJ7 . Then
> 2P-l(wt(x) + wt(y)) (1 + (a') o a) (x,y) - E, Fp(a oa)
1 - 2P-1 2P-1 - 1 2P- 1 - 1
Now, Fp(ax o ay) 2 A(x, y), and thus
E >A(xy)-' A(xY) _>2
- 2P- 1 -- 1 2
Case 2: Suppose A(x, y) < m'/2 - vr. Then
E 2P-1(wt(x) + wt(y)) Fp(a- ) o ay) ,F(a) o ay)E -5   ) (1 - e') = A(x,y) +E1 - 2p-1 2p- 1 - 1 2-1 - 1
Now, Fp(ax o ay) < m', and thus
I' /E A(x, y) + e' -= A(x, y) + Em' < •(2, y) + V/ < M"2P- -1 2
It follows that the parties can decide R "way (1-GH,,,) with communication at most S 1,6(Fp)+
[log m'], where the additive O(log m') = O(log 1/E) is due to the transmission of wt(x). U
4.3 The Randomized 1-way Lower Bound
Here we prove that Rl-way(1-GH) = Q(m). The original proofs of this fact are due to
Indyk and the author [46, 68]. The proof presented here is based on a reduction from the
function IND : {0, 1}m x [m] --+ {0, 1}, where IND(x, i) = xi. The proof is quite similar
to the simplified proof due to Bar-Yossef, Jayram, Kurnar, and Sivakumar [8]. We present
this proof rather than the original proofs [46, 68] due to its simplicity. At the end we will
discuss the original proofs since they establish a number of other results, and in the next
section we will present a new proof due to the author, which is stronger in a certain sense.
Recall that we are assuming all randomized protocols are public-coin. By Theorem 46,
this will change our bounds by at most an additive O(log m) factor, which will not matter.
Also, assume w.l.o.g. that m is odd. The following is well-known, and can be found in [51].
Theorem 60 RI-way(IND) = (m).
We need the following lemma.
Lemma 61 Let m be a sufficiently large odd integer. There is a constant c > 0 such that
for i.i.d. Bernoulli(1/2) random variables B 1,..., B,,, for any i, 1 < i < m,
1 c
Pr[MAJ(B1,...,B7,) = 1 Bi, = 1 > - + ,2 M
where MAJ(Bi,..., Bm) = 1 iff the majority of the Bi are 1.
Proof: Let B • Bi. Then Pr[MAJ(Bi,..., B,) = 1 Bi = 1] = Pr[B > m/2
Bi = 1]. Using Stirling's approximation (see Section 2.9 of [30]), we derive that
Pr[B> •nIBi=- ] = Pr[B=k Bi = 1]
k==rnl
m - 1 2-(m-1)_ 2-(mm1) 2m2
k= " 22
= 2-(m-1) 2n-2 + 2m-1 (1(m- 1) 1))
1
which, for sufficiently large m, is 1/2 + c/V'- for any 0 < c < /'2-. U
We design a protocol II for IND based on a protocol II' for 1-GH, where we assume
w.l.o.g. that II' errs with probability at most 1/12 on all inputs. Let d = c2/9, where c
is the constant in Lemma 61, and assiume w.l.o.g. that dm is an integer. Alice is given
x E {0, 1}dm and Bob is given k E [dm], that is, the parties are given an instance of IND
when Alice's input is of size dm. Alice and Bob use a public coin to generate random
ri,... ,rdm E {0, 1}m. Alice then computes the string s E {0, 1}m as follows: for each
j E [m], sj = MAJ(rij I ,• = 1). Thus, s is just the coordinate-wise majority of the strings
ri for which xi = 1. Alice and Bob then run l'(s, rk). Bob outputs II(x, k) = 1 -Il'(s, rk).
Lemma 62 For all x E {0, 1}m and k E [m],
Pr[II(x, k) = IND(x, k)] i> 3'
where the probability is ver the public coin.
where the probability is over the publ~ic coin.
Proof: Suppose xk = 1. Then
Pr[lI(x, k) = 1] = Pr[II'(s, rk) = 0] > Pr[A(s, rk) • -2 / 
. 
-1 12 12
The equality follows by definition of fl' and the inequality follows from the fact that for
every input (in particular, for (s, rk)), 11' errs with probability at most 1/12.
Let Z1,..., Zm be independent Bernoulli random variables defined as follows: Zi =
Pr[si = rk,i]. By Lemma 61, since there are at most dm coordinates j for which xj = 1,
we have Pr[Zi = 1] > 1/2 + c//-d- ' 1/2 + 3//fi. Let Z = J-', Zi. Then E[Z] =
Em 1E[Z i] > m/2 + 3V-m/. By independence of the Zis, Var[Z] = Z-i1Var[Zi] <
-m1 E[Zi] < m. By Chebyshev's inequality,
Pr Z< -+ < < - .)2
2 - (3,/ - 'z)2 4
Thus, Pr[A(s, rk) < m/2] 2 3/4 and Pr[II(x, k) = 1] > 3/4 - 1/12 = 2/3. An analogous
argument shows that if xk = 0, then Pr[Il(x, k) = 01 2 2/3. This proves the lemma. U
As the communication of II is just that of II', from Lemmna 62 we have,
Theorem 63 R1-waY(1-GH) = Qf(m).
It follows that for e > , we have R1 vaY(1-GHm, ) = tQ(1/c2). Thus, by Corollary 56,
Theorem 64 For any e > 1 and any p 2 0, RI-"a (Tp,C) = Q(1/62).
Using the connection to streaming algorithms given in Theorem 59,
Theorem 65 For any e 2 and any constants p 3 1 and 6 > 0, Sb,(Fp) = -(1/ 2).
Remark 66 The major implications of this algorithm are for p = 0 and p = 2, corre-
sponding to counting distinct elements in a data stream and computing Gini's index of
homogeneity. In both cases, up to sub-logarithmic factors, there are matching 1-pass upper
bounds. For p > 2, there are lower bounds of the form Q(ml- 2/p) [7, 6, 65, 20].
Remark 67 We will not present the original proof of the lower bound due to Indyk and
the author [46], since it did not hold for all m and the proof in the previous section is
simpler. For simplicity, we will also not present the original proof that held for all m due
to the author [68]. That proof is a bit complicated, and uses an approach based on shatter
coefficients [5]. It is worth noting that the more combinatorial approach in [68] established
a few additional results on degree-constrained bipartite graphs. We refer the reader to that
paper for the details.
4.4 A Lower Bound for the Uniform Distribution
We now give a new proof that there is a constant c > 0 for which Rl-waY(c-GH) = t(m).
Unlike the proof in the previous section, our proof uses Yao's minimax principle and goes
through distributional complexity. One advantage of this proof is that it may extend to
multiple rounds, whereas the proof in the previous section cannot. This is because the
IND function in that reduction has a 2-round protocol with only O(logm) bits. To give
further evidence that R(c-GH) = Q(m), in the next section we adapt this argument to prove
that if the protocol is a linear multiround protocol for deciding c-GH, then its randomized
complexity is Q(m). We define such protocols in that section.
Another advantage is the implication this new proof has in practice. Practitioners in the
area may complain that the lower bound in the previous section is artificial in the sense that
the inputs that are hard to approximate are not likely to occur in practice. In practice two
entities may wish to mine their joint data with additional assumptions on the distribution of
their data. A natural assumption is that the input data is uniformly distributed over some
domain. We show that this does not make the problem easier by giving an &(m) bound for
Du-w'aY(c-GH) when p is uniform on X x y.
Assume m is odd. Let p be the uniform distribution on {0, 1}m x {0, 1}m, and let X
and Y be uniform on {0, 1}m. Thus, p = X x Y as distributions.
Lemma 68 For any constant d > 0, for a sufficiently small choice of the parameter c,
Pr [IA(x, y) - m/2 2> cvfi] > 1 - d.(x,y)~ "
Proof: Let v = ((m+m)/2) /2m. There is a constant b > 0 for which v < bm - 1/2 by
Stirling's formula [30]. So Pr[IA(x, y) - n/21 > cv/m7 1 - 2vcvl > 1 - 2bc. Choose c so
that 2bc = d. U
Define the function g : {0, 1}m x {0, 1 m --+ {0, 1} as follows: g(x, y) = 1 if and only if
A(x, y) > m/2.
Corollary 69 For a sufficiently small constant c and constant 6, R6 (c - GH) > Dp,23 (g)
and Rl-waY(c-GH) > D1- W ay 6
Proof: By Lemma 51, R6(c-GH) 2 D,•p(g), where 6' = 6 + p(P4 yes n Pno). By the
previous lemma, for c small enough, p( Pyes n P.o) < 6, so 6' < 26. Since Lemma 51 also
holds if both protocols are one-way, the corollary follows. U
Fix a 1-round protocol II realizing Dl~vy(g). We assume k = D2wa = o(m), and derive
a contradiction. Let M be the single message sent from Alice to Bob in H. Let Alg be the
(deterministic) algorithm run by Bob on M and Y. By the properties of HI,
Pr [Alg(M, Y) = g(X, Y)] Ž 1 - 26.
We need the following information-theoretic inequality, known as Fano's inequality.
Fact 70 ([27]) For any random variables R, S E {0, 1} and any function h,
H(Pr[h(R) = S]) 2 H(S I R).
Applying this inequality with h = Alg and assuming that 6 < 1/6,
H(g(X, Y) I M, Y) < H(26).
We will now lower bound H(g(X, Y) I M, Y) in order to reach a contradiction.
For any r E {0, 1 }k, let Sr be the set of x E {0, 1}m for which M = r. Then E[ISM ] =
2m-k . By a Markov argument, the number of different x contained in some S, for which
ISrI • 2 m-k-i is at most 2m - 1 . Therefore, Pr(x,y)~a,[l SMI 2m-k-1] 2 Let us condition
on the event : ISM] | 2 m-k-1 . By concavity of the entropy,
H(g(X, Y) I M, Y) Ž H(g(X, Y) I M, Y, 8) Pr[6] 2 H(g(X, Y) I M, Y, E)/2.
Now let S E {0, 1}"' be any set of size at least 2m - k-1, and let X' be the uniform distribution
on x E S. For y E {0, 1}m, let V. = Prxx, [g(x, y) = 1]. Then Eyy [V,] = ½. For u E S,
let Cu = 1 if g(u,Y) = 1, and Cu = 0 otherwise. Then Vu = 1 ELus Cu. We use the
second-moment method (see, e.g., [3] for an introduction to this technique).
Consider
Varyy[Vy] = .E[CuCv] - E[Cu]E[C,]
Then E[Cu] = ½ for all u E S. Moreover, E[C ] = j E[C,] = for all u ES. Thus,
Vary[V,] = 12  Ii + (E[CC] - o(1 + 1 (E[Cc] -I I 4)!]S2 U:Av 4
The difficulty is in bounding E[CuCv] Pry [g(u, y) = 1 A g(v, y) = 1]. The latter equals
Pr [wt(y) > m/2 A g(u ( v, y) = 1] = Pr[g(u E v, y) = 1 A wt(y) > m/2]
u(y y
1
= -Pr[g(u D v, y) = 1 i wt(y) > m/2].2 y
Now we use the fact that ISI is large. The following is well-known.
Fact 71 ([67]) For any u E {0, 1}m, the number of v E {0, 1}m for which A(u, v) < m/3
or A(u, v) > 2m/3 is at most 2 -2 H(1/3)m .
Now, |SI > 2m - k - 1 . It follows that of the (I) pairs of u, v E S with u / v, all but
21S I2H(1/3)m of them have Hamming distance at least m/3 and at most 2m/3. Thus, at
least half of the pairs have this property. Let a be the fraction of pairs with this property.
Then a > 1/2.
Var,,y i[V] = 0o(1) + E-S12 1
1
o(1) +
' (u,,)!5n/3 or A(u,v)>2vt/3
+ (E[CuCv )
m/3<A(u,v)<2?m/3
< o()+ - (•CC -
m/3<A(ujv)<2m/3
So(1) +
+ T7S Pr[g(u[9 , y) = 11 wt(y) > m/2] -
m/3<A(u,v)<2mn/32
For u, v with m/3 < A(u, v) < 2m/3, we will upper bound Pry[g(uev, y) = 1 I wt(y) > m/2]
by lower bounding Pry[g(u e v, y) = 0 I wt(y) > m/2]. Let r = wt(u e v) = A(u, v). Then
A(u e v, y) = r + wt(y) - 2t, where t is the number of coordinates which are 1 in both u e v
and in y. Thus, g(u e v, y) = 0 iff 1 + - < t.
We collect some standard facts about the binomial distribution.
Fact 72 For any integer m, (m/2+O(~i)) - .
Proof: Using Stirling's approximation, for any c - O(1),
m/2 + cv (m/2 + cy.-')!(m/2 - cV-))
9(m-)1/2
(1/2 + Cm. 1/2)nm/2+cM1/2 ( 1 / 2 - cm-1/2)m/2-cm'/
2
2
m
o(V/M-)(1 + 2cm-1/2)m/ 2+m'1/ 2 (1 - 2cm-1/2)m/2-cm1/2
2m  2m> e(v )eV/+2C2 
-cv'+2•-2  O( V/)'
where we have used that (1 + x)Y < e•• for all x, y. But (m/2+mc-) • (nm2) = m
, and so (m/2+cvi•
•
i• .= eV
Fact 73 For any constant 3 > 0, there is a constant 17 > 0 for which
Pr [wt(y) < m/2 + P,3/ I wt(y) > m/2] > 71.
Proof: By Fact 72, for any i, m/2 < i < 3f-mi, Pr[wt(y) = i] = e(1/v-m). Thus,
Pr[wt(y) = i I wt(y) > m/2] = 2 -O(/Vm) = O(1/Vm).
Thus,
Pr[wt(y) < m/2 + P,3 I wt(y) > m/2] = P/3rm(1//m) = Q(1) > 7 > 0
for a sufficiently small constant qj.
Fact 74 For any constant / > 0 and any i, m/2 < i < m/2 + Pvr-,
Pr [wt(y) = i m/2 < wt(y) < m/2 + 3/ = Q - .
Proof: By Fact 72, for any i, m/2 < i < /3v'-m there are e(2 m/v/-) strings of weight i.
Thus, after conditioning on the event that m/2 < wt(y) < m/2 + O/3/, these 3V weight
classes all have the same probability of occurring, up to a constant factor. U
Returning to our distributional lower bound and using the facts above, for any constant
/3> 0, there is a constant j7 > 0 for which
Pr[g(u e v, y) = 0 i wt(y) > m/2] : qPr[g(u e v, y) - 0 I m/2 < wt(y) < m/2 + P'-J.Y1·
Pr[g(u e v, y) = 0 I wt(y) = i]
Y
min(r,i)
m/2 i<m/2+ Zi/ )
We claim that this expression is Q(1).
S(v/-). Indeed,
To see this, we first show that min(r, i) - - '+ =2 1
min(r, i) m r
minr ) 2 2 m in(r, i) - - > min(r/2, i - r/2) > m/6,2 2 4 2 -
m/2<.i<m/2+3Vrm-
since m/3 < r < 2m/3, and i > m/2. Next, we show that ( q r = O(2r/vI ).
This follows immediately from the fact that m/2 < i < m/2 + P /m, Fact 72, and the
fact that r -= (m). Next we show that ((_+- o(=-•)) = f(2m-r/vm). This again
follows from the fact that m/2 < i < m/2 + fl//i and Fact 72. It follows that for every
value of i, there are Q(v /) values of t for which (i) -· ) is (2m /m). Now by Fact 72,
( ) = O(2m /V/-) for every value of i. Thus, there are Q(m) pairs of i and t for which
( ( -r) /(m) = (1/v/'m). It follows that
Pr[g(u e v, y) = 0 1 wt(y) > m/21 = Q(1).
y
Thus, Pry[g(u E v, y) = 0 I wt(y) > m/2] = ~2(1). Let ·y> 0 be a constant such that for
sufficiently large m, Pry [g(u e v, y) = 0 I wt(y) > m/2] > y. Returning to our variance
computation,
(1- a)Vary r[Vy] < o(1) +- -
+ 21SP2 [(ru v, y) = 1 wt(y) > m/2] -
m/3<A(u,v)<2m/3
(14 2) 1 F12
m/3<A(u,?,)<2m/3
= o(1)+ + 24 2
So, there is a constant ( < 1/4 for which for sufficiently large m,
vwry-yIv.] < (.
Define the constant +' = , an+ d note that (' < 1/2. It follows by Chebyshev's
inequality that,
Pr V < 1.
Thus, for an Q(1) fraction of y, IVy - 1/21 < (. Let us return to bounding the conditional
entropy. Consider the event
.: jVy - 1/21 5 (',
where Vy is a random variable that depends on Y and is defined with respect to the set of
x in SM. Since X' and Y are independent, the above analysis implies that
Pr [ I ] = (1).
Thus, H(g(X, Y) I M, Y,) = 2(H(g(X, Y) I M,Y, E,)), where the constant in the Q(-)
is absolute (i.e., independent of 6). But, by definition of Vy, if £ n . occurs, then
1/2 - ' Pr [g(x, Y) = 11 < 1/2 + ±'.
Thus, H(g(X, Y) I M, Y, E, F) = Q(1), where the constant is independent of 6. It follows
that H(g(X, Y) I M, Y) = Q(1).
On the other hand, we have shown that H(g(X, Y) I M, Y) < H(26). This is a contra-
diction if 6 > 0 is a small enough constant. Thus, our assumption that k = o(m) was false.
We conclude,
Theorem 75 For a small enough constant c, R -waY(cGH) = Q(Dl-2aY(g)) = (m).
4.5 A Multiround Lower Bound for Linear Protocols
In this section we prove that for a class of protocols that we call linear, the multiround
randomized communication complexity of the gap Hamming distance problem is Q(m).
This can be viewed as a first step in extending the lower bound of the previous section to
hold for more than one round.
Again assume that m is odd and let /x = X x Y be the uniform distribution on {0, 1}m x
{0, 1}m. By Corollary 69, for a small enough constant c > 0, R6(c-GH) > D,,26(g). By
increasing the communication by at most a factor of 2, we may assume that each message
sent between the players is a single bit and that the players take turns alternating messages
with Bob outputting the answer.
Let H be an arbitrary protocol realizing D,26a(g). We think of II as a binary decision
tree with vertices v labeled by subsets S, of {0, 1}m. At the root r, if x E S,, then Alice
transmits a 0, and otherwise she transmits a 1. This corresponds to either going to the
left child of r or the right child of r. Call the visited child w. Then Bob transmits either
a 0 or 1, depending on whether or not y E Sw, and in the decision tree the path goes to
the corresponding child of w. This process repeats until Bob reaches a leaf vertex (we can
assume Bob reaches the leaf vertex by increasing the depth by at most 1), at which point
he outputs the label of the leaf. The cost of I is the depth of this tree.
Definition 76 II is a linear protocol if each set S, in the decision tree for II is described
by a linear function over GF(2). That is, S, is described by a vector Lv E {0, 1}m. If it
is Alice's turn, then if (Lu, x) mod 2 = 0, the protocol branches left, otherwise it branches
right. If it is Bob's turn, then if (Lv, y) mod 2 = 0, the protocol branches left, otherwise it
branches right.
We note that the trivial protocol, in which the parties just exchange inputs, is linear since the
sets S, are described by the unit vectors in {0, 1}m. Protocols in which parties adaptively
sample bits of their inputs are also captured here. Various other classes of protocols can be
reduced to linear ones. For instance, if the sets S, are described by affine functions, then
by swapping certain branches in the decision tree, the protocol can be made linear.
Let II be a protocol realizing D,,2,i(g) and let T be the associated decision tree. We
create a new tree T' as follows. By averaging, there exists a y* E {0, 1}m for which
Pr [II(x, y*) = g(x, y*)] > 1 - 26.
x X
We claim that without loss of generality, we can assume y* = Om . Indeed, consider the
following procedure. Let vl, v2,..., v, be a list of vertices in T that occur in a breath-first-
order starting at the root. So, vi is the root of T, v2 and v3 are its children, v4, V5, v6, v7 its
grandchildren, etc. For v E T, let Lchild(v) be its left child, and Rchild(v) its right child.
1. For i = 1 to r,
* If L, (y*) = 1 and vi is not a leaf, then
- temp -- Lchild(vi).
- Lchild(vi) -- Rchild(vi).
- Rchild(vi) +- temp.
Let T' be the resulting tree. For inputs x and y, let T'(x, y) be the label of the leaf reached
by x and y.
Lemma 77 T'(x, y) = II(x e y*,y e y*).
Proof: We argue inductively that the ith node wi that we visit in T' given inputs x
and y is the same as the ith node that we visit in T given inputs x e y* and y y*.
When i = 1, this is true, since the roots of T and T' coincide. Assume, inductively,
that this is true for some i > 1, and consider the (i + 1)st node visited. If L,~(y*) = 0,
then the left and right children of wi in T are the samie as those in T'. If it is Alice's
turn, then L,,(x E y*) = L,,(x) E L,i(y*) = Lwj(x), and thus we choose the left child
of wi in T' iff we choose the left child of wi in T. Similarly, if it is Bob's turn, then
Lw (y e y*) = Lwi (y) e Lw (y*) = Lw (y), and so we choose the left child of wi in T' iff we
choose the left child of wi in T.
More interestingly, if Lw (y*) = 1, then the children of wi in T are swapped in T'. If it
is Alice's turn, then Lw,(x E y*) = 1 @ L.,, (x), and if it is Bob's turn then Lw, (y y*) =
1 e L,i(y). Thus, in both cases we choose the left child of wi in T' iff we choose the right
child of wi in T. Since the children of wi in T are swapped in T', it follows that the (i + 1)st
node that we visit in T given inputs x D y* and y e y* is the same as the (i + 1)st node
that we visit in T' given inputs x and y. This completes the inductive step, and the lemma
follows since the leaf visited by T'(x, y) is the same as that visited by T(x E y*, y D y*). *
Since for any x, y, y* E {0, 1}m we have g(x, y) = g(x E y*, y ( y*), by the previous lemma
Pr [T'(x, Om) = g(x, 0m)] = Pr [II(x e y*, y*) = g(x, Om)]
= Pr [II(x 0 y*, y*) = g(x E y*, y*)]X-x
= Pr [II(x, y*) = g(x, y*)]
X-X
> 1-26,
so we may indeed assume that y* = 0". In this case g(x, 0 m) = 1 iff wt(x) > m/2.
Now for each level in T' for which it is Bob's turn, we follow the path assuming Bob's
input is Om. This results in collapsing levels for which it is Bob's turn. We are left with a
tree T' in which Alice just follows a path of linear functions and outputs the label of the
leaf at the end of the path. By the propertes of T',
Pr [T'(x) = g(x, Om)] > 1 - 26.
ZX•2
4.5.1 Linear-algebraic Lemmas
Consider the m-dimensional vector space V consisting of all linear combinations of the
variables X1, X 2,..., Xm with coefficients in GF(2).
Let A be a set of linearly independent vectors in V. Suppose we extend A to a basis of
V by adding as many Xi as possible.
Definition 78 The extension number, denoted ex(A), is the maximum number of Xi we
may add to A in order to obtain a basis of V.
Since the Xi are linearly independent, ex(A) = m - IAI. Say a set B C {X1,...,Xm}
realizes ex(A) if the vectors in A U B are linearly independent and IBI = ex(A).
Lemma 79 Let A C V be a set of linearly independent vectors. Suppose L ý span(A). If
B realizes ex(A), then a subset of B realizes ex(A U {L}) = ex(A) - 1.
Proof: Let B realize ex(A), so that A U B is a basis of V. Write L = -aEA' a @ -bEB' b
for unique A' C A and B' C B.
Note that B' $ 0 since L V span(A). Let b' E B'. The claim is that the vectors (A U
{L}) U (B \ {b'}) are linearly independent. Any non-trivial zero combination must have the
form EaEA" aeLE-bEB,, b = 0, for soime A" C A and B" C B\{b'}. Using the definition of
L, -aEA" a G-EaEA' ae ZbEB' be •EbEfR" b = 0. Rewriting, EaEA"AA' a (1 bEB"AB' b = 0.
Since A U B is a basis, A"AA' = B"AB' = 0. But b' E B"AB', a contradiction. Thus,
B \ {b'} realizes ex(A U {L}). U
Let A C V be a set of linearly independent vectors, and let B realize ex(A). Let B' =
{X 1,...,Xn) \ B. For v E V, let p(v) be the projection of v onto A, and let a(v) be the
projection of v onto B.
Lemma 80 The set of vectors {p(Xi) I Xi E B'} is a linearly independent set.
Proof: By definition, B U B'I = m. Thus the multiset { p(Xi) I Xi E B'} U B has size m.
To prove the lemma, we will show that rank({p(Xi) I Xi E B'} U B) = m.
First note that for all Xi E B', Xi E span(A U B) since A U B is a basis. Thus, for all
Xi E B', Xi = p(Xi) e a(Xi). It follows that for all Xi E B', Xi E span({p(Xi) I Xi E
B'} U B). Thus for all i, Xi E span({p(X,) I Xi E B'} U B). But X 1,...,Xr are linearly
independent, so their rank is m, and thus rank({p(Xi) I Xi e B'} U B) = m. M
4.5.2 The Lower Bound for Linear Protocols
For each node v E T', let A, be the set of linear combinations queried from the root along
the unique path to v in T', including the query made at v. We may assume, w.l.o.g., that
the set of linear combinations queried along any path are linearly independent since any
node with a dependent linear combination may be collapsed. Moreover, we can assume T'
is a complete binary tree. This does not change the depth, which is the communication
complexity. Let k be the depth of T', so that any path from root to leaf contains exactly
k + 1 nodes. We will derive a contradiction assuming k = o(m).
Let B, be a set of vectors realizing ex(A,). By Lcnmma 79, we may assume that for
all v,w E T for which w is a child of v, B,, C B, and IBI = BvI - 1. Define B', =
{X1,..., Xm} \ B, for each vertex v.
Bounding the Conditional Entropy
Let Lo, L 1,..., Lk be the linear combinations in T queried, and let A = (Lo, L 1, Lk) be
the list of these combinations. Note that the Li and A are random variables. Define the
list U of evaluations of these random variables:
U = (Lo(X),LI(X),..., Lk(X)).
Note that U determines A, Lo, L1,..., Lk. Let Alg be the (deterministic) algorithm run to
determine the label of a leaf. By the properties of T',
Pr [Alg(U) = g(X, 0m )] > 1 - 26.
x-X
By Fact 70, H(g(X, Om) I U) < H(26). We will now lower bound H(g(X, Oml) I U) in order
to reach a contradiction.
We define the events El and £2 as follows. Let B be the set of vectors realizing ex(A).
Note that there may be more than one such set. We choose B = B,, where v is the leaf
reached in T' on input X, and B, is as defined above. Let B' = {Xi,..., Xm} \ B. Note
that B and B' are random variables and B U B' is a basis of V. Since k = o(m) and T' is
non-empty, we have IBI, IB'I > 0.
Let W1 be the number of different Xi E B for which Xi = 1. Define the event
W1  IBI
Recall that c is the parameter in the c-GH problem. Let W2 be the number of different
Xi E B' for which Xi = 1. Define the event
E2 W: JB'I - B-v¶ 1.2 c
Note that £1 and £2 are independent since B U B' is a basis of V and B n B' = 0. The crux
of the argument is the following lemma.
Lemma 81 For a sufficiently small choice of the parameter c > 0,
Pr[Li A Ž2] > 1 - S.
Before proving this, let us see how it implies a contradiction. By concavity of the entropy,
H(g(X, Om) I U) Ž> H(g(X, Om) U, 1 A E2) Pr[l A £2]
2 H(g(X,OM') U, 9 A E2)(1 - 6).
By the definition of conditional entropy,
H(g(X, Om) I U,£1 A 2) = E Pr[U = u I 1 A 2] - H(g(X, Om ) I U = uA E A 2).
Let F be the event that W1 - 2 > c x/i. Fix any u for which Pr[U = u 1 1 A £2] > 0.
Conditioned on 91 n E2 and U = u, g(X, On) = 1 iff T occurs. Indeed, g(X, Om) = 1 iff
W1 + W2 > m/2. Since k = o(m) and B realizes ex(A), IB'I = o(m) and IBI = m - o(m).
By definition of events 1i and £2, conditioned on £1 fn £2, W1 + W2 > m/2 iff F occurs (for
sufficiently large m). Thus,
H(g(X, Om ) I U = uA ,1I A L2) = H(f I U = uA EL A L2).
Let Pu = Pr,,x [F. I U = u A 1 A 82]. By the definition of entropy,
1 1
H(.F I U = u A A E2) = Pu log2 - -PU)1g2 1-
Let bi, b2 ,..., btBI be the vectors in B, and let b,b,..., b'B,I be the vectors in B'. Let
S+ C {0, 1}1BI be the vectors with weight more than IBB/2 + cV i•i, and let S- be the
vectors with weight less than IBI/2 - c IBI ones. Let S = S+ U S-. Let S' C {0, 1}IB'I be
the set of vectors of weight less than IB'I/2 + v/IBT[/c but weight at least IB'|/2- Vx /Bic.
For s E {0, I}IB, we use the notation b = s to indicate that bi(x) = sl,b 2 (x) =
82,... , bBl(X) = SIBI. Analogously, we use the notation b = s' for s' E {0, 1}IB'I to indicate
that b'(x) = s' , b2(x) = s2, .., b, 1(x) S IB'.
In the following, for any events 91 and g2 we let Pr[g 1 g2] = 0 whenever Pr[g 2] = 0.
Lemma 82
pU1= Pr [F I U=uAb= sAb' = t] Pr [6= sAI= t I U= uAIAg21
sE{• ,1}IBI, tE•O,1}IB'I
Proof: By definition of El and 82,
Pr[S1 A E2 ] Pr[b= sA b' = t].
s,t
By Bayes' rule, and noting that Pr[U = u A El A 82] > 0 by our choice of u,
Pr[P A U = u A l A E2]
Pr[P I U = u A E1 A2] = Pr[F -u A u 1 A E2]
Noting that the events F A (U = u) A (b = s) A (b = t) are disjoint for different s and t, via
another application of Bayes' rule,
Pr[FA U = u A 1 A 82] ,t Pr[FA U = u A b A = t]
Pr[U = u A E1 A 82 ] Pr[U = u A E1 A 62]
S',t Pr[F. U = u A b = s A • = t] Pr[U = u A b = s A b = t]
Pr[U = u A El A 82]
Since the events b = s and b = t imply 91 A 82 occurs, we can rewrite the above as
Pr[.F I U = uA = s A = t]Pr[U u A •= s A P = t A 92 C]Pr[U = u AE1 A S2]
= Pr[I U = uAb= sA = t] Pr[b= sAb= tlU=uA AS 2],9,t
which completes the proof. U
Now consider a term Pr[F I U = u A b = s A b = t]. Note that A U B is a basis for V, so the
event U = u A b = s uniquely determines the value t(s) of Y. It follows from the previous
lemma that by dropping terms that are zero, we may write
Pu= Pr[FI U=uA =s]Pr s U = u A 1 A 2]
sE{O,1}IBI
Since A U B is a basis of V, Pr[U = u A b = s] > 0 for any values of u and s, and in fact
this probability is independent of s. The occurrence of F is entirely determined from the
event b = s, and T occurs iff wt(s) > IBI/2 + c/i . Thus, we may rewrite pu as
Pu= 5 Pr[b = s I U = uA £1A £2].
sES +
Since A U B is a basis and An B = 0, for any s E S + we have Pr[ = s I U = u A S1 A 52] =
Pr[b = s El]. Thus,
Pu = Pr[b = s I ]i.
By symmetry, Pu = Pr[b E S+ I 11] = Pr[b E S- E1] = 1/2. It follows that H(Y I U =
u A £1 A 92) = 1. At long last, it follows that H(g(X, 01O) 1 U) > 1 - 6.
For small enough 6 > 0, this contradicts our earlier observation that H(g(X, Y) I U, Y) <
H(26). We conclude that k = Q(m).
It remains to prove Lemma 81.
Proof of Lemma 81: : We argue that both Pr[51] } 1 - 6/2 and Pr[i 2] > 1 - 6/2 for
a sufficiently small choice of the parameter c, which implies the lemma by a union bound
(and actually, El and E2 are even independent). We have,
Pr[E1 ] = ) Pr[E1 I U = u] Pr[U = u] (law of total probability)
U
S Pr W L- > ci II U = u Pr[U = u] (definition)
- Pr [ - > ci ] Pr[U = u] (independence)
> Z(1 -6/2)Pr[U =u] (Lemma 68)
U
= 1 -6/2.
Now we bound the more difficult probability, Pr[&2] = Pr [W2 - * < Vii]I
Let Z1,...,Zr be the r random variables in B'. Since for all nodes u and v in the
decision tree for which v is a child of u, we have B, C Bu, we have Bu C B',. Moreover,
since IB|, = IBuI - 1, IB•u = IB,I - 1. Therefore, we can think of the Z 1,..., Zr as being
added to the set B' one-by-one along the path taken in T'. Thus, Z1 denotes the first
random variable added to B', Z2 the second, etc.
We claim that it suffices to show that the random variables Z1,..., Zr are i.i.d. Bernoulli(.5)
random variables. Suppose for the moment that we could prove this. The following is a
standard fact about the binomial distribution on N variables.
Fact 83 Let X1,..., XN be i.i.d. Bernoulli(.5) random variables. For any constant d > 0
and for a sufficiently small choice of the parameter c (that depends on d),
Pr Xi N < l > 1 - /2.
Applying the fact to the Zi, we will have Pr[E2] > 1 -· 6/2, as needed.
It remains to show that Z1,...,Z, are i.i.d. Bernoulli(.5) random variables.
For a node u E T' and for any vector v E V, let pu(v) be the projection of v onto
Au. We inductively show that for any u visited aloug the random path in T', the set
{pU(Zi) I Zi E Bu} is a set of i.i.d. Bernoulli(.5) random variables. Thus, when i = r we
will have that p(Zi),..., p(Zr) are i.i.d. Bernoull(.5) random variables. We will later show
this implies that Z 1,..., Zr are i.i.d. Bernoulli(.5) random variables.
Base case: Let u be the root of T', so B' = {Z 1}. Then Z 1 = Lo E aU(Zi), where
acU(Zi) is the projection of Z1 onto Bu. Thus, pu(Zi) - Lo(X) = Uo, which is Bernoulli(.5).
Inductive step: Assume that for the jth vertex visited along the path in T', call it
u, {pu(Zi) I Zi E Bul is a set of i.i.d. Bernoulli(.5) random variables. Suppose u' is the
j + 1st vertex visited. We need to show that the set {pu'(Zi) I Zi E Bu,} is a set of i.i.d.
Bernoulli(.5) random variables. For all Zi E Bu,, we have Zi E span(Au, U Bu,).
Let Z be the unique element in B u,, \ B( = Bu \ Bu,. Then Au, = Au U {Lj+ } (since u'
is the (j + 1)st vertex visited in T'). For those Zi E B', in span(As, U Bu,), we have pu' (Zi) =
pu(Zi) since the vectors in Au, U Bu, are linearly independent and Au U Bu, C Au, U Bu,.
Now if Zi is in B, but not in span(A U Bu,), then au(Zi) has a non-zero coefficient in
front of Z. It follows that pu'(Zi) = pu(Zi) e pu'(Z). Since Z E span(Au U {Lj+l} U Bu,),
but Z 0 span(A U Bu,) (since Z can be added to B,1 to obtain Bu, and the vectors in
Au U Bu are linearly independent), it follows that pU' (Z) has a non-zero coefficient in front
of Lj+ . Since Lj+1(X) = Uj+ 1 and Uj+I is independent of U1,...,Uj, it follows that
pu'(Z) is Bernoulli(.5) and independent of the random variable (pu(Z1),..., pu(Zj)), which
is determined by U1,..., Uj.
It follows by the inductive hypothesis and the above that the random variables in the
set
{pu'(Zi) I Zi e Bu,} = {pU(Z)} U {pU'(Zi) I Zi E Bu}
= {P(Z)}
U {pu(Zi) I Zi E Bu and Zi E span (Au U Bu,)}
U {pu(Zi) 9 p"' (Z) I Zi E Bu' and Zi ý span (Au U Bu,)},
are i.i.d. Bernoulli(.5).
Thus, we have shown that p(Zi),..., p(Z,r) are i.i.d. Bernoulli(.5) random variables. It
remains to show that this implies Zi,..., Zr are i.i.d. Bernoulli(.5) random variables. For
each i, 1 < i < r, we have Zi = p(Zi) t a(Zi). For any fixed assignment b = s, we have
Zi = p(Zi) e 3i, where 3i E (0, 1} is the result of evaluating o(Zi) on s. Now since the
p(Z.) are i.i.d. Bernoulli(.5), so are the p(Zi) e /3i. Thus, the Zi are i.i.d. Bernoull(.5).
The proof of the lemma is now complete. U
Theorem 84 For a constant c > 0, for linear protocols Rb(c-GH) Ž Dy,23(g) = Q(m).
The lower bound for unrestricted multiround randomized protocols is still open. Our con-
jecture is the following, which was made independently by Ravi Kumar [52]. This problem is
listed as the 10th question in the list of open problems at the IITK Workshop on Algorithms
for Data Streams (http://www.cse.iitk.ac.in/users/sgauguly/data-stream-probs.pdf).
Conjecture 85 For every constant c > 0, R(c-GH) = P(m).
Chapter 5
Private Protocol for the Euclidean
Distance
Recent years witnessed the explosive growth of the amount of available data. Large data
sets, such as transaction data, astronomical data, the web, or network traffic, are in abun-
dance. Much of the data is stored or made accessible in a distributed fashion. This necces-
sitates the development of efficient protocols that compute or approximate functions over
such data (e.g. see [13]).
At the same time, the availability of this data has raised significant privacy concerns. It
became apparent that one needs cryptographic techniques in order to control data access
and prevent potential misuse. In principle, this task can be achieved using the general
results of secure function evaluation (SFE) [70, 36]. However, in most cases the resulting
private protocols are much less efficient than their non-private counterparts (an exception
is the result of [60], who show how to obtain private and communication-efficient versions
of non-private protocols, as long as the communication cost is logarithmic). Moreover, SFE
applies only to algorithms that compute functions exactly, while for many problems, only
efficient approximation algorithms are known or are possible. Indeed, while it is true that
SFE can be used to privately implement any efficient algorithm, it is of little use applying
it to an approximation algorithm when the approximation leaks more information about
the inputs than the solution itself.
In a pioneering paper [29], the authors introduced a framework for secure computation
of approximations. They also proposed an O)(v/)-conununication 1 two-party protocol for
approximating the Hamming distance between two binary vectors. This improves over the
linear complexity of computing the distance exactly via SFE, but still does not achieve the
polylogarithmic efficiency of a non-private protocol of [54]. Improving the aforementioned
bound was one of the main problems left open in [29].
In this and the next chapter we provide several new results for secure computation of
approximations. In this chapter we provide a O(1)-:ommunication protocol for approxi-
mating the Euclidean (e2) distance between two vectors. This, in particular, solves the
open problem of [29]. Since distance computation is a basic geometric primitive, we believe
that our result could lead to other algorithms for secure approximations. Indeed, in [2] the
authors show how to approximate the e2 distance using small space and/or short amount
of communication, initiating a rich body of work on streaming algorithms.
5.1 Cryptographic Tools
We start by reviewing homomorphic encryption, oblivious transfer (OT), and secure func-
tion evaluation (SFE).
Homomorphic Encryption: An encryption scheme, E : (GI, +) - (G2, .) is homo-
morphic if for all a, b E G1, E(a + b) - E(a) -E(b). For more background on this primitive
see, for example, [37, 59]. We will make use of the Paillier homomorphic encryption scheme
[63]. in some of our protocols and so we briefly repeat it here:
1. Initialize: Choose two primes, p and q and set N = p - q. Let A = Icm(p - 1, q - 1).
Let the public key PK = (N, g) where the order of g is a multiple of N. Let the secret
key, SK = A.
2. Encrypt: Given a message M e ZN, choose a random value x E Zý. The encryption
of M is, E(M) = gMxNmodN 2.
3. Decrypt: Let L(u) = ('_1, where u is congruent to 1 modulo N.To recover M from
E(M) calculate, L(g~AImodN) d N.
'We write f = 0(g) if f(m, k) = 0 (g(m, k) logo(1) (m)poly(k)), where k is a security parameter.
In [63] it's shown that the Paillier encryption scheme's semantic security is equivalent to
the Decisional Composite Residuosity Assumption. The following shows homomorphy:
E(MI) - E(M 2 ) = (gMIx1N mod N2 ) (gM2X2N mod N 2)
= gMI+M2(xlX2)N mod N2 = E(M1 + M2).
Oblivious Transfer and SPIR: Oblivious transfer is equivalent to the notion of symmetrically-
private information retrieval (SPIR), where the latter usually refers to communication-
efficient implementations of the former. SPIR was introduced in [34]. With each invocation
of a SPIR protocol a user learns exactly one bit of a binary database of length N while
giving the server no information about which bit was learned. We rely on single-server
SPIR schemes in our protocols. Such schemes necessarily offer computational, rather than
unconditional, security [24]. Applying the transformation of [61] to the PIR scheme of [17]
give SPIR constructions with 6(N) server work and 6(1) communication.
One issue is that in some of our schemes, we actually perform OT on records rather than
on bits. It is a simple matter to convert a binary OT scheme into an OT scheme on records
by running r invocations of the binary scheme in parallel, where r is the record size. This
gives us a 1-round, 0(r) communication, O(Nr) server work OT protocol on records of size
r. The dependence on r can be improved using techniques of [23].
Secure Function Evaluation: In [36, 70] it is shown how two parties holdings inputs
x and y can privately evaluate any circuit C with communication O(k(ICI + -xI + ljy)),
where k is a security parameter. In [16] it is shown how to do this in one round for the
semi-honest case we consider. The time complexity is the same as the communication. We
use such protocols as black boxes in our protocols.
5.2 Privacy
We assume both parties are computationally bounded and semi-honest, meaning they follow
the protocol but may keep message histories in an attempt to learn more than is prescribed.
In [36, 18, 60], it is shown how to transform a semi-honest protocol into a protocol secure in
the malicious model. Further, [60] does this at a communication blowup of at most a factor
of poly(k). Therefore, we assume parties are semi-honest in the remainder of the paper.
We briefly review the semi-honest model, referring the reader to [35, 55] for more details.
Let f : {0, 1}* x {0, 1}* --+ {0, 1}* x {0, 1}* be a function, the first element denoted fi(x1, X2)
and the second f2(xl, x2). Let 7r be a two-party protocol for computing f. The views of
players P1 and P2 during an execution of 7r(xI, x2), denoted View'(xi, X2) and View'(xi, x2)
respectively, are:
View(xl, x2 ) = (x1,ri,mj1,. .. ,ml,t),View(xj,x2) - (x 2 , r2, 2,1,... , m2,t),
where ri is the random input and mij the messages received by player i respectively. The
outputs of P1 and P2 during an execution of 7r(x, x2) are denoted output (xI, X2) and
output"(x1, x2). We define outputf(X 1 , x2) to be (outputr(xl, x2), output (X1, X2)). We
say that 7r privately computes a function f if there exist PPT algorithms SI, S2 for which
for i E {1, 2} we have the following indistinguishability
{Si(Xi, fi(X, X2)) f(Xl, X2)} _ View(x, X2), outputt(xl, x2)}-
This simplifies to {Si(xi, fi(xI,x 2))} 1 {View((xLx 2)'} if either fl(xlx 2) = f2(xl : 2) or if
f(xl, x2) is deterministic or equals a specific value with probability 1 - negl(k, N), for k a
security parameter.
We need a standard composition theorem [35] concerning private subprotocols. An
oracle-aided protocol (see [55]) is a protocol augmented with a pair of oracle tapes for each
party and oracle-call steps. In an oracle-call step parties write to their oracle tape and
the oracle responds to the requesting parties. An oracle-aided protocol uses the oracle-
functionality f = (fl, f2) if the oracle responds to query x, y with (fi(x, y), f2(x, y)), where
fi, f2 denote first and second party's output respectively. An oracle-aided protocol privately
reduces g to f if it privately computes g when using oracle-functionality f.
Theorem 86 [35] If a function g is privately reducible to a function f, then the protocol
g' derived from g by replacing oracle calls to f with a protocol for privately computing f,
privately computes g.
We now define the functional privacy of an approximation as in [29]. For our approximation
protocols we will have f (x, y) = f2(x, y) f(x, y).
Definition 87 Let f(x, y) be a function, and let f(x, y) be a randomized function. Then
f(x, y) is functionally private for f if there is an efficient simulator S s.t. for every x, y,
we have f(x, y) - S(f(x, y)).
A private approximation of f privately computes a randomized function f that is function-
ally private for f.
Finally, we need the notion of a protocol for securely evaluating a circuit with ROM. In
this setting, the ith party has a table Ri E (0O, 1}r) S defined by his inputs. The circuit,
in addition to the usual gates, is equipped with lookup gates which on inputs (i, j), output
Theorem 88 [60] If C is a circuit with ROM, then it can be securely computed with
O(ICIT(r, s)) communication, where T(r, s) is the communication of 1-out-of-s OT on words
of size r.
5.3 Private Euclidean Distance
Here we give a private approximation of the £2 distance. Alice is given a vector a E [N]m,
and Bob a vector b E [N]m. Note that jha- b112 < T Oma f mN2 . In addition, parameters E, 6
and k are specified. For simplicity, we assume that k =Q2(log(Nm)). The goal is for both
parties to compute an estimate E such that IE - |IlxI21 5 eI|Ixl 2 with probability at least
def1-6, for x = a - b. Further, we want E to be a private approximation of Ix21. As discussed
there, wlog we assume the parties are semi-honest. We set the parameter B = O(k); this
notation means B = ck for a large enough constant c independent from k, n, M, 6, e. In our
protocol we make the following cryptographic assumptions.
1. There exists a PRG G stretching polylog(m) bits to m bits secure against poly(m)-
sized circuits.
2. There exists an OT scheme for :ommunicating 1 of m bits with communication
polylog(m).
At the end of the section we discuss the necessity and plausibility of these assumptions.
Our protocol relies on the following fact and corollary.
Fact 89 [56] Let A be a random m x m orthonormal matrix (i.e., A is picked from a
distribution defined by the Haar measure.). Then there is c > 0 such that for any x E •m,
any i= 1,...,m, and any t > 1,
Pr[(Ax)i > t• < ei 2.
Corollary 90 Suppose we sample A as in Fact 89 but instead generate our randomness
from G, rounding its entries to the nearest multiple of 2 -e (B) . Then,
Vx e Em, Pr[(1 - 2-B)llxzI2 < I5Ax112 < I|xI12 and V(Ax) < x2] > 1- neg(k,m)
Proof: If there were an infinite sequence of x E [N]m for which this did not hold, a circuit
with x hardwired would contradict the pseudorandomness of G. U
Protocol Overview: Before describing our protocol, it is instructive to look at some natural
approaches and why they fail. We start with the easier case of approximating the Hamming
distance, and suppose the parties share a common random string. Consider the following
non-private protocol of [54] discussed in [29]: Alice and Bob agree upon a random O(log m) x
m binary matrix R where the ith row consists of m ii.d. Bernoulli(,3) entries, where / is
a constant depending on e. Alice and Bob exchange Ra, Rb, and compute R(a - b) = Rx.
Then Ilxii can be approximated by observing that Pr[(Ra)i = (Rb)i] ; 1/2 if ix|| >> f-i,
and Pr[(Ra)i = (Rb)i] J 1 if ljxii << 0-i. Let the output be E. The communication is
O(log m), but it is not private since both parties learn Rx. Indeed, as mentioned in [29], if
a = 0 and b = ei, then Rx equals the ith column of R, which cannot be simulated without
knowing i.
However, given only 11xi|, it is possible to simulate E. Therefore, as pointed out in [29],
one natural approach to try to achieve privacy is to run an SFE with inputs Ra, Rb, and
output E. But this also fails, since knowing E together with the randomness R may reveal
additional information about the inputs. If E is a detgerministic function of Ra, Rb, and if
a = 0 and b = ei, Alice may be able to find i from a and R.
In [29], two private protocols which each have 7'(m) communication for a worst-case
choice of inputs, were cleverly combined to overcome these problems and to achieve O(Vm1 )
communication. The first protocol, High-Distance Estimator, works when ]lxii > v'i. The
idea is for the parties to obliviously sample random coordinates of x, and use these to
estimate 121xI. Since the sampling is oblivious, the views depend only on 11xll, and since it
is random, the estimate is good provided we take (( ') samples.
The second protocol, Low-Distance Estimator, works when lxi| vf5m. Roughly, the idea
is for the parties to perfectly hash their vectors into O(Vi-) buckets so that at most one
coordinate j for which aj $ bj lies in any given bucket. The parties then run an SFE with
their buckets as input, which can compute |lx|I exactly by counting the number of buckets
which differ.
Our protocol breaks this O(v i-) communication barrier as follows. First, Alice and
Bob agree upon a random orthonormal matrix A in R1e xm , and compute Aa and Ab. The
point of this step is to uniformly spread the mass of the difference vector x over the m
coordinates, as per Fact 89, while preserving the length. Since we plan to sample random
coordinates of Ax to estimate 11x l, it is crucial to spread out the mass of ljxll, as otherwise
we could not for instance, distinguish x - 0 from x = e., The matrix multiplication can be
seen as an analogue to the perfect hashing in Low-Distance Estimator, and the coordinate
sampling as an analogue to that in High-Distance Estimator.
To estimate IIx2 from the samples, we need to be careful of a few things. First, the parties
should not learn the sampled values (Ax)j, since these can reveal too much information.
Indeed, if a = 0, then (Ax)j = (Ab)j, which is not private. To this end, the parties run a
secure circuit with ROM Aa and Ab, which privately obtains the samples.
Second, we need the circuit's output distribution E to depend only on 11x l. It is not
enough for E[E] = jlx 112, since a polynomial number of samples from E may reveal non-
simulatable information about x based on E's higher moments. To this end, the circuit
uses the (Ax)j to independently generate r.v.s zj from a Bernoulli distribution with success
probability depending only on ljx I. Hence, zj depends only on lixl|.
Third, we need to ensure that the zi contain enough information to approximate Ix II.
We do this by maintaining a loop variable T which at any point in time is guaranteed to
be an upper bound on ix|IX 2 with overwhelming probability. Using Corollary 90, for all j
it holds that q = m(Ax) /(TB) < 1 for a parameter B, so we can generate the zj from a
Bernoulli(q) distribution. Since T is halved in each iteration, for some iteration E[Ej zj]
will be large enough to ensure that E is tightly concentrated.
We now describe the protocol in detail. Set f = 8(-(B)(1/e21og(Nm) log(1/6) + k). In
the following, if q > 1, then the distribution Bernoulli(q) means Bernoulli(1).
Note that the protocol can be implemented in 0(1) rounds by parallelizing the secure circuit
invocations.
Analysis: To show the correctness and privacy
lemma.
Lemma 91 The probability that assertion 3a
neg(k, m). Moreover, when the algorithm exits,
E[Ej zj] 2 f/(3B).
of our protocol, we start with the following
holds in every iteration of step 3 is 1 -
with probability 1 - neg(k, m) it holds that
Proof: By Corollary 90, PrA[(1 - 2-" '3)Ix 2 _< lAxl| 2 < |1xjl 2 and Vi(Ax)2 < 2B] =
1 - neg(k, rn), so we may condition on this occurring. If lx 112 = 0, then Pr[Ax = 0] = 1 -
neg(k, m), and thus Pr[E = 0] = 1 - neg(k, m). Otherwise, |IxI12 > 1. Consider the smallest
j for which T,,ax/2j < Ijxj1 2 . We show for T = T,,,,,/2]- 1 > |x|1l2 > 1 that Pr[Ej Zj <
f2 -Approx (a, b):
1. Alice, Bob exchange a seed of G and generate a random A as in Corollary 90
2. Set T = T,aIx
3. Repeat:
(a) {Assertion: jxj[2 < T }
(b) A secure circuit with ROM Aa, Ab computes the following
* Generate random coordinates il,..., i and compute (Ax) , ... (Ax),
* For j E [], independently generate zj from a Bernoulli (m(Ax)/ I(TB))
distribution
(c) T = T/2
4. Until Ei zi > 4 or T < 1
5. Output E = 2 Ej zi as an estimate of |Ix|12
e/(4B)] = neg(k, m). The assertion holds at the beginning of the jth iteration by our choice
of T. Thus, m(Ax)2 < TB for all i E [m]. So for all j, Pr[zj = 1 = > (1-2-B)/(2B),
and thus E[Ej zj] > e/(3B). By a Chernoff bound, Pr[•j zj < e/(4B)] = neg(k, m), so if
ever T = Tmax/2 j -1, then this is the last iteration with overwhelming probability. U
Correctness: We show Pr[IE - 11x1121 < E] > 1 - 6. By Lemma 91, when the algorithm
exits, with probability 1 - neg(k, m), E [•i zi] > -, so we assume this event occurs. By a
Chernoff bound,
Pr •zi -E zi 2:E zi zI > 2
By Lemma 91, assertion 3a holds, so that
t(1 - 2-B)jI Ij2 < TB .E[ zi] Le 1112
Setting E = •-B zi (recall that T is halved in step 3c) shows that Pr[IE - Ilxl12 >
11x112]1 <•.
Privacy: We replace the secure circuit with ROM in step 3b of £2-Approx with an oracle.
We construct a single simulator Sim, which given A d I1x112, satisfies Sim(A) c Viewf(a, b)
and Sim(A) - Viewv(a,b), where Vievwn(a,b), View"(a, b) are Alice, Bob's real views re-
spectively. This, in particular, implies functional privacy. It will follow that e2-Approx is a
private approximation of A.
With probability 1 - neg(k, m), the matrix A satisfies the property in Corollary 90, so we
assume this event occurs. In each iteration, the random variables zj are independent in both
the simulation and the protocol. Further, the probabilities that zj = 1 in the simulated
and real views differ only by a multiplicative factor of (1 - 2 -B) as long as T > A. But the
probability that, in either view, we encounter T < A is neg(k, m).
Complexity. Given our cryptographic assumptions, we. use 0(1) communication and 0(1)
rounds.
Remark 92 Our cryptographic assumptions are fairly standard, and similar to the ones
in [29]. There the authors make the weaker assumptions that PRGs stretching mt bits to
m bits and OT with m y communication exist for any constant y. In fact, the latter implies
the former [41, 40]. If we were to instead use these assumptions, our communication would
be O(mi), still greatly improving upon the O(m1/2 + 'y) communication of [29]. A candidate
OT scheme satisfying our assumptions can be based on the O-Hiding Assumption [17], and
can be derived by applying the PIR to OT transformation of [61] to the scheme in that
paper.
Remark 93 For the special case of Hanmning distance, we have an alternative protocol
based on the following idea. Roughly, both parties apply the perfect hashing of the Low-
Distance Estimator protocol of [29] for a logarithmic number of levels j, where the jth level
contains O(2J) buckets. To overcome the O(-~ -ii) barrier of [29], instead of exchanging
Sim (A):
1. Generate a random seed of G
2. Set T = Tmax
3. Repeat:
(a) For j E [f], independently generate zj from a Bernoulli(A/(TB)) distribution
(b) T = T/2
4. Until Z i _ Žý or T < 1
5. Output E = 2TB i zi
the buckets, the set of buckets is randomly and obliviously sampled. From the samples,
an estimate of A(a, b) is output. For some j, 2i - A(a, b), so the estimate will be tightly
concentrated, and for reasons similar to i2-Approx, will be simulatable. We omit the details,
but note that two advantages of this alternative protocol are that the time complexity will
be O(m) instead of ((m 2), and that we don't need the PRG G, as we may use k-wise
independence for the hashing.
Chapter 6
Private Protocols for Efficient
Matching
In this chapter, we look at secure computation of a near neighbor for a query point q (held
by Alice) among n data points P (held by Bob) in {0, 1 }d. We improve upon known results
[28, 32] for this problem under various distance metrics, including e2, set difference, and
Hamming distance over arbitrary alphabets. Our techniques also result in better commu-
nication for the all-nearest-neighbors problem, where Alice holds n different query points,
resolving an open question of [32], and yield a binary inner product protocol with commu-
nication d + O(k) in the common random string model.
However, all of our protocols for the near neighbor problem have the drawback of needing
Q(n) bits of communication, though tlhe dependence on d is often optimal. Thus, we focus
on what we term the approximate near neighbor problem. For this we introduce a new
definition of secure computation of approximations for functions that return points (or sets
of points) rather than values.
Let Pt(q) be the set of points in P within distance t from q. In the c-approximate near
neighbor problem, the protocol is required to report a point in Pcr(q), as long as Pr(q) is
nonempty. We say that a protocol solving this problem is c'-private (or just private if c' = c)
if Bob learns nothing, while Alice learns nothing except what can be deduced from the set
Pdr(q). In our paper we always set c' - c.
We believe this to be a natural definition of privacy in the context of the approximate
near neighbor problem. First, observe that if we insist that Alice learns only the set Pr (as
opposed to Pr), then the problem degenerates to the exact near neighbor problem. Indeed,
even though the definition of correctness allows the protocol to output a point p E Pr - Pr,
in general Alice cannot simulate this protocol given only the set Pr. Thus, in order to
make use of the flexibility provided by the approximate definition of the problem, it seems
necessary to relax the definition of privacy as well.
Within this framework, we give a protocol based on dimensionality reduction [54] with
communication 6(n 1/2 + d) for any constant c > 1. We show how the dependence on
d can be made polylogarithmic if Alice just wants a coordinate of a point in P,r. We
also give a protocol bacsed on locality-sensitive hashing (LSH) [45), with communication
6(n1/2+1/(2c) + d), but significantly less work (though still polynomial).
Finally, proceeding along the lines of [39], we say the protocol leaks b bits of information
if it can be simulated given b extra bits which may depend arbitrarily on the input. With
this definition, we give a protocol with 6 (n1/3 + d) communication leaking only k bits,
where k is a security parameter.
We also give an alternative protocol, based on locality-sensitive hashing (LSH) [45],
with communication O(n 1/ 2+ 1/ (2c) + d), but significantly less work. That is, the work of the
previous scheme is O(nd) + np(c- 1), where p(x) = O(1/x2 + log(1 + x)/(1 + x)). Although
this is polynomial work for constant c, the computation time can be costly in practice, e.g.,
p(1) - 12, see [42], p. 34 for a plot of the function. In contrast, the time complexity of the
LSH scheme is at most O(n 2(d + n)) for any c.
Here we consider the setting in which Alice has a point q, and Bob a set of n points P.
6.1 Exact Problems
6.1.1 Private Near Neighbor Problem
Suppose for some integer U, Alice has q E [U]d, Bob has P = pi,..., pn E [U]d, and Alice
should learn mini f(q, pi), where f is some distance function. In [28] protocols for t1, f 2 ,
Hamming distance over U-ary alphabets, set difference, and arbitrary distance functions
f(a, b) = E 1l fi(ai, bi) were proposed, using an untrusted third party. We improve the
communication of these protocols and remove the third party using homomorphic encryption
to implement polynomial evaluation as in [32], and various hashing tricks.
In [32], the authors consider the private all-near neighbors problem in which Alice has
n queries q1,...,qn E [U]d and wants all pi for whicl A(pi,qj) <• t < d for some j and
parameter t. Our techniques improve the O(n2d) communnication of a generic SFE and the
O(n(d)) communication of [32] for this problem to Q((nd 2 + n 2). Finally, in the common
random string model we achieve [log d] + O(k) communication for the (exact) Hamming
distance, and an inner product protocol with d + O(k) communication.
6.1.2 Private Near Neighbor for f2 and Hamming Distance
Alice has q E [U]d, and Bob a set of points P = PI,,..,p,, in [U]d. Alice should output
argmini -j lPj - qj 12. The protocol is easily modified to return the pi realizing the mini-
mum. We assume a semantically secure homomorphic encryption scheme E such as Paillier
encryption, that the message domain is isomorphic to Zm for some m, and that m is large
enough so that arithmetic is actually over Z.
Using the homomorphy of E and the 0(n)-sized circuit in step 3, we make the communi-
cation b(n + d) rather than the 0(nd) of a generic SFE. The correctness is easy to verify.
Using theorem 86 and the semantic security of E, privacy is just as easy to show. We note
a natural extension to 4p distances: Alice sends
{E(qi1)}, {E(qi qi,2)},..., {E(qij. qip1)},
where ii,..., ip-1 range over all of [d]. The communication is 0(n + dP-1), which is inter-
esting for d = O(nl/(p-2)
Exact-£2(q, P):
1. Alice generates (PK, SK) for E and sends PK, E(qi),..., E(qd) to Bob
2. For all i, Bob computes (by himself) zi = E((q,pi)) and vi = Wpill2
3. A secure circuit with inputs q, SK, {zi}i, and {vi}i computes
* (q, Pi) = DSK(Zi) for all i
* Return argmini(vi - 2(q, p1))
6.1.3 Private Near Neighbor for Generic Distance Functions
Now Alice wants mini f(q, pi) for an arbitrary f(a, b) t= 1E fi(ai, b1). We use homomor-
phic encryption to implement polynonial evaluation as in [32].
The proofs are similar to those of the previous section and are omitted. The communication
here is 0(dU+n), improving the O(ndU) communication of [28]. A special case of the result
in section 6.1.5 improves this to ((d 2 + n) in case f(a, b) is Hamming distance and U > d.
6.1.4 Private Near Neighbor for n = 1
We now show how Alice, holding q E {0, 1}d, and Bob, holding p E {0, 1}d for some prime d,
can privately compute A(q, p) with communication d[log d] + O(k). This extends to solve
the private near neighbor problem for n = 1 with communication 2d[log dl + 6(k). The
communication outperforms the O(dk) communication of SFE.
We assume both parties have access to the same uniformly random string. We need a
homomorphic encryption whose message domain can be decoupled from its security param-
eter. Recall in Paillier encryption that if encryptions are k bits long, messages are about
k/2 bits long. For low communication we want the domain to be very small, that is, roughly
d elements instead of 2k/2. To do this, we use a Benaloh encryption scheme E [12], which
is homomorphic and semantically secure assuming the prime residuousity assumption. The
message domain is Zd while encryptions are of size k.
The correctness of the protocol is straightforward. The key property for security is that if R
is uniformly random, then for any PK, SK, the E(zl),..., E(zd) are independent uniformly
random encryptions of random elements zl,..., zd E [dE .
To see complexity dFlog d] + o(d), the list of si's that Alice sends has length d log d].
Also, E(A(q,p)) has length k, the security parameter, which can be set to d' for any
E > 0. Similar techniques give d + O(k) communication for private inner product, using
GM-encryption [37].
6.1.5 Private All-Near Neighbors
We consider the setting of [32], in which Alice and Bob have Q = ql,...q, E [U]d and
P = pl,... ,pn E [U]d respectively, and Alice wants all p, for which A(qi,pj) _ t < d for
some i E [n] and parameter t. We assume a semantically secure homomorphic encryption
scheme E and OT with polylog(n) communication.
Exact-1(q, p):
1. Alice generate (PK, SK) for E, and sends PK to Bob
2. Both parties interpret 1 the common random string R as d encryptions E(zi)
3. Alice obtains the zi by decrypting, and sends Bob si = qi - zi mod d for all i
4. Bob computes (by himself) E(zi + qi) = E(qi) and E(Ed. (ps + (-1)Piqi))
E(A(p, q))
5. Bob rerandomizes the E(A(p, q))
6. Alice outputs DSK(E(A(p, q))) = A(x, y)
Theorem 94 The above is a private all-near neighbors protocol with communication )(nd2-
n2).
Proof: We first argue correctness, which means showing Pr[Y = {yj I 3i s.t. A(qi,pj) <
t}] = 1 - 2 -"(k). We show for i,j E [n], Pr[A(qi,pj) = n - Zi,] = 1 - 2-R(k). By a union
bound, for any h,
Pr[D(Zi,j) = n - A(qi,pj)] > T/2T = 1/2.
But D(Zi,j) > n - A(qi, pj) since hashing only increases the number of agreements. Thus,
Pr[min1 D(Zi,j1 ,) > n - A(qi,pj)] < 2-O(k), so that Zi, =z n - A(qi,p j ) with the required
probability.
For privacy, since the output assumes a specific value with probability 1 - 2- O(k), we
All-Near(Q, P):
1. The parties randomly permute their points
2. Alice generates parameters (PK, SK) of E and sends Bob PK
3. For l= 1,...,k,
* The parties choose a pairwise independent hash function h : [U] -- [2d]
* For i E [n], Alice computes Xi = h(xi), where h is applied coordinate-wise
* Replace each entry j of each ii with a length 2d unit vector with rth bit 1 iff
ij = r
* Bob forms ij similarly
* Alice sends the coordinate-wise encryption of each vector for each coordinate of
each ii
* Bob computes (by himself) Zij,, = E(A(%., : j)) for all i,j E [n]
4. A secure circuit with inputs SK, Zij,l computes
* Zi, = minm DsK(Zij,l)
* Output Z = {j I 3i s.t. Zij > d - t} to Alice
5. Perform OT on records of size d for Alice to retrieve Y = {yj I j E Z}
just need to show each party's view is simulatable. As usual, we replace the SFE and OT
by oracles. Alice's output from the SFE is a list of random indices, and her output from the
OT is her protocol output. Hence, her simulator just outputs a list of IY| random indices.
Bob's simulator chooses k random hash fmnctions and 2d2 nk encryptions of 0 under E. By
the semantic security of E and theorem 86, the protocol is secure.
To see that the communication is O(nd2 +n 2 ), in each of k executions, Alice sends O(nd2)
encryptions. Bob then inputs O(n 2 ) encryptions to the SFE, which can be implemented
with a circuit of size 0(n 2 ). Step 5 of the protocol can be done with O(nd) communication
using the best OT schemes (see [23, 17]). U
Remark 95 A simple modification of the protocol gives the promised O(d 2 + n) comnmu-
nication for Hamming distance in the setting of [28] for any U.
Remark 96 The protocol can be adapted to give O(d+n) communication for set difference.
In this case Alice has a single vector q. The idea is that Alice, Bob can hash their entries
down to 2d values using h as in the protocol, and now Alice can homomorphically encrypt
and send the coefficients of a degree-(2d- 1) polynomial pol, where pol is such that pol(t) = 0
if t E {r I 3i s.t. r = h(qi) } and pol(t) == 1 otherwise. Bob can evaluate pol on each (hashed)
coordinate of each pi and use E's homomnorphy to compute E(f(q, Pi)), f denoting set
difference. We then repeat this k times over different h and take a maximum in the SFE.
Since coordinate order is immaterial for set difference, we achieve 0(n + d) instead of
O(n + d2 ) commnunication.
Although we have improved the communication of [32J, one may worry about the work the
parties need to perform. We have the following optimization:
Theorem 97 The protocol can be implemented with total work )(n 2d2c- 4 ), where c z 2.376
is the exponent of matrix multiplication.
Proof: The work is dominated by step 3, in which Bob needs to compute encryptions of
all pairwise Hamming distances. To reduce the work, we think of what Alice sends as an
encrypted n x d2 matrix M 1 , and that Bob has a d2 x n matrix M 2 and needs an encrypted
M/1M 2 . It is shown in [11] that even the best known moatrix multiplication algorithm still
works if one of the matrices is homomorphically encrypted. Thus Bob can perform (n/d 2) 2
fast multiplications of d2 x d2 matrices, requiring O((n/d 2) 2(d2)r) = o(n2d2r-4 ) work, which
improves upon the 6(n2d2) work of a naive implementation. U
6.2 Approximate Near Neighbor Problems
6.2.1 Private c-approximate Near Neighbor Problem
Suppose q E {0, 1}d and pi E {0, 1}d for all i. Let Pt = {p eP A(p, q) < t}, and c > 1 be
a constant.
Definition 98 A c-approximate NN protocol is correct if when Pr = 0, Alice outputs
a point f(q, P) E P, with probability 1 - 2-I(k) . It is private if in the computational
sense, Bob learns nothing, while Alice learns nothing except what follows from Pc. For-
mally, Alice's privacy is implied by an efficient simulator Sim for which (q, P, f(q, P))
(q, P, Sim(1n , Per, q)) for poly(d, n, k)-time machines.
Following [39], we say the protocol leaks b bits of information if there is a deterministic
"hint" function h : {O, 1}(n +1)d _+ {0, 1}b such that the distributions (q, P, f(q, P)) and
(q, P, Sim(1n , Per, q, h(P, q))) are indistinguishable. We believe these to be natural exten-
sions of private approximations in [29, 39] from values to sets of values.
We give a private c-approximate NN protocol with communication O(vn + d) and a c-
approximate NN protocol with communication O(n 1/ 3 +d) which leaks k bits of information.
Both protocols are based on dimensionality reduction in the hypercube [54]. There it is
shown that for an O(logn) x d matrix A with entries i.i.d. Bernoulli(1/d), there is an
7 = -(r, cr) such that for all p, q E {0, 1}d, the following event holds with probability at
least 1 - 1/poly(n)
If A(p, q) < r, then A(Ap, Aq) S r, and if A(p, q) > cr, then A(Ap, Aq) > 7.
Here, arithmetic occurs in Z2. We use this idea in the following helper protocol DimReduce(r, B, q, P).
Let A be a random matrix as described above. Let S = {p E P A(Ap, Aq) < 7}. If
ISI > B, replace S with the lexicographically first B elements of S. DimReduce outputs
random shares of S.
It is an easy exercise to show the correctness and priva.cy of DimReduce.
Remark 99 As stated, the communication is O(dB). The dependence on d can be im-
proved to 0(d + B) using homomorphic encryption. Roughly, Alice sends E(ql),..., E(qd)
to Bob, who sets L(v) to be the first B different E(A(pi, q)) for which A(Api, v) < 7. Note
that E(A(pi, q)) is efficiently computable, and has size O(1) < d.
It will be useful to define the following event K(rl, r 2 , P) with rl < r2. Suppose we run
DimReduce independently k times with matrices Ai. Then H-(rl, r2, P) is the event that at
least k/2 different i satisfy
Vp E Prl, A(Aip, Aiq) • r(ri, r 2 ) and Vp E P\ PF2, A(Aip, Aiq) > r(ri, r2).
The next lemma follows from the properties of the Ai and standard Chernoff bounds:
Lemma 100 Pr[7(rl, r2, P)] = 1 - 2 - 1.(k)
6.2.2 Reducing the Dependence on d for Private c-approximate NN
Here we sketch how the communication of the protocol of section 6.2.3 can be reduced to
((n1 / 2 + polylog(d)) if Alice just wants to privately learn some coordinate of some element
of Pr.
DimReduce (--, B, q, P):
1. Bob performs the following computation
* Generate a matrix A as above, and initialize L to an empty list.
* For each v E {0, 1}(logn), let L(v) be the first B pi for which A(Api, v) < T.
2. A secure circuit with ROM L performs the following computation on input (q, A),
* Compute Aq.
* Lookup Aq in L to obtain S. If ISI < B, pad S so that all S have the same
length.
* Output random shares ($', S2) of S so that S = S 1 E S2.
Proof Sketch: The idea is to perform an approximation to the Hamming distance
instead of using the E(A(pi, q)) in the current protocol (see, e.g., DimReduce, and the
following remark). The approximation we use is that given in [54], namely, the parties
will agree upon random matrices Ai for some subset of i in [n], and from the Aipi and
Aiq will determine (1 ± e) approximations to the A(pi, q) with probability 1 - 2- k. We
don't need private approximations since the parties will not learn these values, but rather,
they will input the Aipi, Aiq into a secure circuit which makes decisions based on these
approximations.
More precisely, Bob samples B of his vectors pi, and in parallel agrees upon B matrices
Ai and feeds the Aipi into a secure circuit. Alice feeds in the Aiq. Let c > 1 + 8e. The
circuit looks for an approximation of at most r(1 + 6e). If such a value exists, the circuit
gives Alice the corresponding index. Observe that if IPr(1+4t)l > y'¶, then with probability
1 - 2- k an index is returned to an element in Per, and that this distribution is simulatable.
So assume IPr(1+4)OI < ~¶.
The parties proceed by performing a variant of DimReduce(r(r, r(1 + 4e)), B, q, P), with
the important difference being that the output no longer consists of shares of the E(A(pi, q)).
Instead, for each entry L(v), Bob pretends he is running the approximation of [54] with Al-
ice's point q. That is, the parties agree on B different matrices Ai and Bob computes Aip for
each p E L(v). A secure circuit obtains these products, and computes the approximations.
It outputs an index to a random element with approximation at most r(1 + 2E). If Pr is
nonempty, such an index will exist with probability 1 - 2- k. Also, the probability that an
index to an element outside of Pr(1+4c) is returned is less than 2-k, and so the distribution
of the index returned is simulatable.
Finally, given the index of some element in Pcr, the parties perform OT and Alice obtains
the desired coordinate, The communication is now O( V). 0
6.2.3 c-approximate NN Protocol
Protocol Overview: Our protocol is based on the following intuition. When JPer, is large, a
simple solution is to run a secure function evaluation with Alice's point q as input, together
with a random sample P' of roughly a k/IPcrI fraction of Bob's points P. The circuit
returns a random point of P' n Pe,, which is non-empty with overwhelming probability.
The communication is O(n/IPcrl).
On the other hand, when PcrI is small, if Alice and Bob run DimReduce(r(r, cr), iPcr , , P)
independently k times, then with overwhelming probability Pr C UiSi, where Si denotes
the (randomly shared) output in the ith execution. A secure function evaluation can then
take in the random shares of the Si and. output a random point of Pr. The communication
of this scheme is O(IPcri).
Our protocol combines these two protocols to achieve O(v/-) communication, by sam-
pling roughly an n - 1/ 2 fraction of Bob's points in the first protocol, and by invoking DimRe-
duce with parameter B = O( v) in the second protocol. This approach is similar in spirit
to the "high distance / low distance" approach used to privately approximate the Hamming
distance in [29].
Using the ideas in Remark 99, the communication is 6O(d+ B), since the SFE has size 0(B).
Let .F be the event that P' n Pcr 0, and put N = 7-(r, cr, P).
Correctness: Suppose Pr is nonempty. The probability s of correctness is just the proba-
bility we don't output 0. Thus s > Pr[tf] + Pr[-~F] Pr[ff(q, P) 4 01 -.r].
Case IPFel r /-: For sufficiently large B, we have s > Pr[.F] = 1- 2-O(k)
c-Approx (q, P):
1. Set B = O(vn).
2. Independently run DimReduce(r(r, cr), B, q, P) k times, generating shares (S 1 , S?).
3. Bob finds a random subset P' of P of size B.
4. A secure circuit performs the following computation on inputs q, S_, S?, P'.
* Compute Si = S1 E SI for all i.
* Let f(q, P) be a random point from Pcr n P' $ 0 if it is non-empty,
* Else let f(q, P) be a random point from Pr n UiSi if it is non-empty, else set
f(q, P) = 0.
* Output (f(q, P), null).
Case IPcrl < n: It suffices to show Pr[f(q, P) 0 I |--] = 1 - 2 -2(k ) . But this probability
is at least Pr[f(q, P) 0 N, -F] Pr['H], and if N occurs, then f(q, P) 7 0. By Lemma
100, Pr[N] = 1 - 2-2(k)
Privacy Note that Bob gets no output, so Alice's privacy follows from the composition
of of DimReduce and the secure circuit protocol of step 5. Similarly, if we can con-
struct a simulator Sim with inputs 1", Pe, q so that the distributions (q, P, f(q, P)) and
(q, P, Sim(1 : , Pcr, q)) are statistically close, Bob's privacy will follow by that of DimReduce
and the secure circuit protocol of step 5.
Sim (n, Pcr, q):
1. Set B'= 6(nl/2).
2. With probability 1 - (n-BP, ()-, output a random element of Per,
3. Else output a random element of Pr.
Let X denote the output of Sim(l", Pr, q). It suffices to show that for each p E P,
SPr[f(q, P) == p] - Pr[X = p]I = 2 -1(k), since this also implies I Pr[f(q, P) =0] - Pr[X =
0]l = 2 -Q1(k ) . We have
Pr [f(q, P) = p] = Pr [f(q, P) p, T] + Pr [f(q, P) = p, -F]
= Pr [f(q, P) p, Y] + Pr [f(q, P) = p, -F I N] ± 2- (k)
= Pr[F] |Pcr.: + Pr[-'F]Pr[f(q,P)= p N, F] f 2 -Q(k)
where we have used Lemma 100. Since Pr[ ] = 1 - (" •I"i)()-1, we have
IPr[f(q, P) == p]-Pr[X = p] -Pr[-?F] Pr[f(q, P) = p iN, 7- - 6(p E Pr) P r -1+ 2 - (k)
If IPcrl Vn, then Pr[-F] = 2-a (k). If IPer < v, then Pr[f(q, P) = p i - ] = 6(p E
r)Extensions: The way the current poblm is stated there is an (d) lower bound. In
Extensions: The way the current piroblem is stated, there is an Q(d) lower bound. In
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appendix 6.2.2 we sketch how, if Alice just wants to learn some coordinate of an element of
Pr, this dependence can be made polylogarithmic. We also have a similar protocol based
on locality-sensitive hashing (LSH), which only achieves 6(n 1/ 2+1/(2c) + d) communication,
but has much smaller time complexity (though still polynomial). More precisely, the work of
the LSH scheme is no(1) , whereas the work of c-Approx is nO(1/(c-1)2), which is polynomial
only for constant c. See Appendix 6.2.4 for the details.
6.2.4 Private c-approximate NN Based on Locality Sensitive Hashing
We give an alternative private c-approximate NN protocol, with slightly more communi-
cation than that in section 6.2.1, but less work (though still polynomial). It is based on
locality sensitive hashing (LSH) [45]. The fact we need is that there is a family of functions
g : {0, 1}d {0, 1}o ( 1) such that each g E g has description size 0(1), and g is such that
for all p,q E {0 ,1}d,
Pr [g(p) = g(q)] = (9 n-apq)/cr)
Recall that Alice has a point q E {0,1}d and Bob has n points P C {0, 1}d . For
correctness, Alice should learn a point of Per provided Pr 7 0. For privacy, her view should
be simulatable given only Pcr.
Our protocol is similar to that in section 6.2.1. Whln I Pr is large, one can run a secure
function evaluation with Alice's point q as input, together with a random sample P' of
roughly a k/r Per fraction of Bob's points P. The circuit returns a random point of P' n Pcr
which is non-empty with probabiity 1 - 2-(k :) . The communication is O(n/P,,cr).
On the other hand, when IPrI is small, if Alice and Bob exchange functions gi indepen-
dently O(nl/c) times, then with overwhelming probability P, C UiSi, where Si denotes the
subset of Bob's points p with gi(p) = gi(q). Using a secure ciruit with ROM, we can obtain
these sets Si, and output a random point of P,. The communication is O(nt/p).
Our protocol balances these approaches to achieve 0(n1/ 2+1/( 2 c)) communication.
There are a few technicalities dodged by this intuition. First, even though the parties
exchange Q(nl/c) different gi, and can thus guarantee that each p is in some Si with proba-
bility 1 - 2- 1l (k), it may be that whenever p E Si, many points from P \ Pr also land in Si,
so that Si is very large. Even though we only expect I P \ Pcr l(1/n) = 0(1) points from
P \ P, in Si, since Pr[p E Si] = e(n - 1/ c) is small, p may only be in Si when Si is large.
Because the size of the Si affects the c-ommunication of our protocol, we cannot always
afford for the ROM to receive the whole Si (sometimes we will truncate it). However, in
the analysis, we show that the average S- is small, and this will be enough to get by with
low communication.
Second, we need to extend the notion of a lookup gate given earlier. Instead of just
mapping inputs (i, j) to output Ri [j], the jth entry in the ith party's ROM, we also allow j
to be a key, so that the output is the record in Ri keyed by j. This can be done efficiently
using [23], and Theorem 88 is unchanged, assuming the length of the keys is 6(1).
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LSH (q, P):
1. Set B = O(n1/ 2+1/(2c)) and C -= (nl/c).
2. Bob finds a random subset P' of P of size B.
3. For i = 1 to k,
(a) Alice and Bob agree upon C random gi,j E g.
(b) Bob creates a ROM L with entries L(v) containing the points p for which g(p) =
V.
(c) A secure circuit with ROM L performs the following computation on input
(q, {gij }),
* Compute vij = gi,j(q) for each j.
* Lookup the L(vi,j) one by one for the different vij until the communication
exceeds dB. If it is less, make dummy queries so that it is exactly dB.
* Output shares S', S2 so that S1 e Sf is the (possibly truncated) set of sets
L(vj).
4. A secure circuit with inputs P', Si7, S2 ,
* Compute the set Si = Sl g S2 = UjL(vj) for all i.
* Let f(q, P) be random in P~, n P' if it is non-empty.
* Else let f(q, P) be random in Pr n UiSi if it is non-empty, else set f(q, P) = 0.
* Output (f(q, P), null).
The communication is O(dB). By using homomorphic encryption, one can reduce the de-
pendence on d, as per remark 99. Let E be the event that P, C UiSi, and let F be the event
that Per n P' is non-empty.
Correctness: Suppose Pr - 0. The probability s of correctness is just the probability
we don't output 0. Thus s > Pr[F] + Pr[-] Pr[f(q, P) # 0 1
Case IPcr, Ž n1/ 2- 1/(2c): For sufficiently large B, we have s > Pr[7] = 1 - 2- Q(k )
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Case LPerl < nl/2 -1/(2 c): It is enough to show Pr[f(q,P) # 0 I -F] = 1- 2 -- (k). Fix
i. Put Y = Ej IL(vi,j)l, where IL(vi,j)l denotes the number of points in L(vi,j). The ex-
pected number of points in P \ Pe, that are in L(vij) is at most n -O(1/n) = 0(1). Since
IPcrI < n1/ 2-1/( 2c), E[L(vi,j)] < n1/ 2" 1/(2c) + O(1). Thus E[Y] 5 B/3 for large enough
B, so Pr[Y > B] < 1/3 by Markov's inequality. Thus, with probability 1 - 2- 1(k), for at
least half of the i, Si is not truncated in step 3c. Moreover, for large enough B, any i, and
any p E Pr, Pr[p E Si] = 1 - 2- 0 (k) for large enough C. By a few union bounds then,
Pr[Pr C UiSi] = Pr[E] = 1 - 2 - 1(k) . Thius,
Pr[f(q, P) 0 I -.F] > Pr[f(q, P) $ 0, 1 -F ] = Pr[f(q, P) 0 1 -, -F] Pr[&] > 1-2 - 1(k)
Privacy: Note that Bob gets no output, so Alice's privacy follows from that of the se-
cure circuit protocol. We construct a simulator Sim(In, Per, q) so that the distributions
(q, P, f(q, P)) and (q, P, Sim(1n, Per, q)) are statistically close. Bob's privacy then follows
by the composition with the secure circuit protocol.
Let X denote the output of Sim(l1, Per, q). It suffices to show that for each p E P,
IPr[f(q, P) = p] - Pr[X = p]| = 2 -1(k), since this also implies Pr[f(q, P) = 0] - Pr[X =
0]l = 2 -1(k ) . We have
Pr [f(q, P) = p] = Pr [f(q, P) = p, F] + Pr [f(q, P) = p, -TF]
= Pr [F] Pcr-l +Pr[f(q,P) = p, F]
Note that Pr[F] = 1 - (1n-PcrI)()-1. Therefore,
I Pr[f(q, P) = p] - Pr[X = p]I = Pr[-F] Pr [f(q, P) p I F] - 6(p Pr) PrI -I.
104
Sim (1n, per,,, q):
1. Set B = )(n1/2+1/(2c)).
2. With probabiity 1 - (nI-c l)(n)i, output a random element of Pr.
3. Else output a random element of P,.
If IPcrl > n1 /2 - 1/(2 c), this is 2 - "(k), since then Pr[-iF] = 2 - .(k). Otherwise, Pcr <
n 1/2 -1/( 2c), and as shown in the proof of correctness, we have Pr[&] = Pr[Pr C UiSi] =
1 - 2 - 1(k) . Thus
Pr[f(q, P) = p I-] = Pr[f(q, P) = p I , --F] Pr[E] ± 2 -c2(k) = 6(p E Pr)lPrI- 1 ± 2 -1(k),
which completes the proof.
6.2.5 c-approximate NN Protocol Leaking k Bits
Protocol Overview: We consider three balls Pr C Pbr g PF, where c - b, b - 1 E E(1). We
start by trying to use dimensionality reduction to sepalrate Pr from P \ Pbr, and to output
a random point of Pr. If this fails, we try to sample and output a random point of P,,r.
If this also fails, then it will likely hold that n1/3 < Ij.rI • IPcrI < n 2/3. We then sample
down the pointset P by a factor of n- 1/3, obtaining with survivors Pbr, Per of Pbr, Per
respectively. It will now likely hold that we can use dimensionality reduction to separate
Fbr from P \ icr to obtain and output a random point of Abr. The hint function will encode
the probability, to the nearest multiple of 2 - k, that thex- first dimensionality reduction fails,
which may be a non-negligible function of P \ Pr. This hint will be enough to simulate the
entire protocol.
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The protocol can be implemented in polynomial time with communication O(B + d) =
()(n1 / 3 + d).
To prove correctness and privacy, we introduce some notation. Let £1 be the event that
the majority of the ISiJ are less than B, and £2 the event that Pr C UiSi. Let F be the
event that P' n Per f 0. Let g1 be the event that 1 < J, < Per • B and g2 the event that
Pb C UiSi. Finally, let 71i = 7l(r, br, P) and 7H2 = 7(br, cr, P). Note that Pr[I1],Pr[W12]
are 1 - 2 - n(k) by Lemma 100. We need two lemmas:
Lemma 101 Pr[92 I91] = 1- 2- f (k)
Proof: If 71I and EL occur, then there is an i for which Pr _ Si, so £2 occurs. U
Lemma 102 Pr[G2 I 1] = 1 - 2- Q(k)
Proof: If W-2 and L2 occur, then the majority of the Si contain Pb, so o2 ccurs. U
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c-ApproxWithHelp (q, P):
1. Set B = ((n/ 3 ).
2. Independently run DimReduce(r(r, br), B, q, P) k times, generating shares (Sil, S).
3. Bob finds random subsets P', P of P of respective sizes B and n2 /3 .
4. Independently run DimReduce(f(br, cr), B, q, P) k times, generating shares (S, Sr).
5. A secure circuit performs the following computation on inputs q, Sý, S?, P', i1, S2.
* Compute Si = S, a S2 and Si = S ,'2 for all i.
* If for most i, ISgI < B, let f(q, P) be a random point in Pr n UiSi, or 0 if it is
empty.
* Else if Pr n P' $ 0, let f(q, P) be a random point in Pr n P'.
* Else let f(q, P) be a random point in Pbr n UiSi if it is non-empty, otherwise set
f(q, P) = 0.
* Output (f(q, P), null).
Correctness: We may assume Pr # 0. The probability s of correctness is just the proba-
bility the algorithm doesn't return 0. Since F, E1, and G1 are independent,
s 2 Pr[E1] Pr[E2 I El] + Pr[El](Pr[_F] + Prf-'-] Pr[Gl] Pr[9 2 I 91l).
Case IPrl < B: h1 implies £1 since P1%r < B, and using Lemma 101, s > Pr[l1] Pr[E2 I
El] = 1 - 2-1(k)
Case IPbrl > B: Since Pr[E2 I E1] = 1 - 2- 1(k) by Lemma 101, we just need to show
that Pr[F] + Pr[-iF] Pr[G1] Pr[9 2  G1 = 1 - 2 -Of(k) If IPr > n2/3, it suffices to show
Pr[.F] = 1 - 2 -1(k). This holds for large enough B -= ((nl/ 3 ). Otherwise, if IPenl • n2/3,
then it suffices to show Pr[G 1] Pr[9 2 I] = 1 - 2 - 1(k) . By assumption, B < IPbrl •
IP2,J n2/3.Therefore, for large enough B, Pr[9 1] = I - 2 - O(k), and thus by Lemma 102,
Pr[G 1] Pr[G 2 I 91] = 1- 2-n(k)
Privacy: Note that Bob gets no output, so Alice's privacy follows from the composi-
tion of DimReduce and the secure circuit protocol of step 5. Similarly, if we can construct
a simulator Sim with inputs In, Per, q, h(Pr,, q) so that the distributions (q, P, f(q, P)) and
(q, P, Sim(1n , Per, q, h(Per, q))) are statistically close, Bob's privacy will follow by that of
DimReduce and the secure circuit of step 5.
We define the hint function h(Per, q) to output the nearest multiple of 2-k to Pr[&1]. In
the analysis we may assume that Simr knows Pr[S 1] exactly, since its output distribution in
this case will be statistically close to its real output distribution.
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Sim (1", Pcr, q, Pr[tfl):
1. Set B = ((n 1 / 3).
2. With probabiity Pr[81], output a random element of Pr, or output 0 if Pr = 0.
3. Else with probability 1 - (n-Bf (nrl)( -1, output a random element of Pcr,
4. Else output a random element of Pbr.
Let X denote the output of Sim(P1, P,, q, Pr[Sl]). It suffices to show that for each p E P,
I r[f(q,P) = p] - Pr[X = p]- = 2-O(k)
since then we have Pr[f(q, P) = 0] - Pr[X = 0] = 2-Q(k). Using the independence of
TT, E1, g 1, and Lemmas 101, 102, we bound Pr[f(q, P) E- p] as follows
Pr[f(q, P)= p] = Pr[, f(q, P) : p] + Pr[--E, f(q, P) = p]
= Pr[E1] Pr[f(q, P) = p I £21] ± 2-•k ) + Pr[-,1] Pr[.F] Pr[f(q, P) = p I F, -i]
+ Pr[-El] Pr[-i] Pr[f(q, P) = p I-, -El]
= Pr[Si] PrI-'S(p E Pr) ± 2- 0(k) + r[-Sl] Pr[l]IP FrI-1
+ Pr[-,l] Pr[-F] Pr[G1] Pr[f(q, P) p g1 2--'8 1•] ± 2 -Q(k)
+ Pr[-I•] Pr[-,.F] Pr[-,g 1 ] Pr[f(q, P) = p Ig l-,--l]
= Pr[Il]jPr|-l6(p E Pr) + Pr[-El] PrLF]IPcrK' + Pr[-$ 1] Pr[-F ] Pr[g1 ]LPb•l-lb(p E Pbr)
+ Pr[-81 l] Pr[-F] Pr[-,g 1] Pr[f(q, P)= p 1 I--1] f 2- (k)
On the other hand, since Pr[I] = 1- (w-e )(j)-1, we have
Pr[X = p] = Pr[Si] PrI-1 6(p E Pr)+Pr[-- 1E] Pr[~F]Pr I 1+pr[ 1]Pr[-FY]IPbl-16(p E Pbr),
so that
I Pr[f(q, P) =- p]-Pr[X = p]| < Pr[-l] IPr[•F] Pr[-~g 1 ] Pr[f(q, P) = p I -El-.F-•1]+2-(k)
If IPbrl < B, Pr[-E1] = 2 -Q(k) . If lPC Ž n2/3, Pr[-F] = 2-1(k). Otherwise B < IPbr. <
Pcr, < n2/ 3, and as shown for correctness, Pr[-g 1] = 2-Q(k), which shows IPr[f(q, P)=
p] - Pr[X p] I = 2 -'(k).
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